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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall
On Tue, Mar 26, 2019 at 3:35 AM Reshetova, Elena
<elena.reshetova@intel.com> wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 1:16 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 2:41 AM Elena Reshetova
> > > <elena.reshetova@intel.com> wrote:
> > > > Performance:
> > > >
> > > > 1) lmbench: ./lat_syscall -N 1000000 null
> > > > base: Simple syscall: 0.1774 microseconds
> > > > random_offset (rdtsc): Simple syscall: 0.1803 microseconds
> > > > random_offset (rdrand): Simple syscall: 0.3702 microseconds
> > > >
> > > > 2) Andy's tests, misc-tests: ./timing_test_64 10M sys_enosys
> > > > base: 10000000 loops in 1.62224s = 162.22 nsec / loop
> > > > random_offset (rdtsc): 10000000 loops in 1.64660s = 164.66 nsec / loop
> > > > random_offset (rdrand): 10000000 loops in 3.51315s = 351.32 nsec / loop
> > > >
> > >
> > > Egads! RDTSC is nice and fast but probably fairly easy to defeat.
> > > RDRAND is awful. I had hoped for better.
> >
> > RDRAND can also fail.
> >
> > > So perhaps we need a little percpu buffer that collects 64 bits of
> > > randomness at a time, shifts out the needed bits, and refills the
> > > buffer when we run out.
> >
> > I'd like to avoid saving the _exact_ details of where the next offset
> > will be, but if nothing else works, this should be okay. We can use 8
> > bits at a time and call prandom_u32() every 4th call. Something like
> > prandom_bytes(), but where it doesn't throw away the unused bytes.
>
> Actually I think this would make the end result even worse security-wise
> than simply using rdtsc() on every syscall. Saving the randomness in percpu
> buffer, which is probably easily accessible and can be probed if needed,
> would supply attacker with much more knowledge about the next 3-4
> random offsets that what he would get if we use "weak" rdtsc. Given
> that for a successful exploit, an attacker would need to have stack aligned
> once only, having a knowledge of 3-4 next offsets sounds like a present to an
> exploit writer... Additionally it creates complexity around the code that I
> have issues justifying with "security" argument because of above...
>
> I have the patch now with alloca() and rdtsc() working, I can post it
> (albeit it is very simple), but I am really hesitating on adding the percpu
> buffer randomness storage to it...
>

Hmm. I guess it depends on what types of attack you care about. I
bet that, if you do a bunch of iterations of mfence;rdtsc;syscall,
you'll discover that the offset between the user rdtsc and the
syscall's rdtsc has several values that occur with high probability.

--Andy

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