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SubjectRe: [PATCH ghak90 V5 02/10] audit: add container id
On 2019-03-27 21:38, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:33 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a
> > process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to document the event.
> >
> > This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
> > the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the
> > newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or
> > an additional task added to a container.
> >
> > The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
> >
> > The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
> >
> > This will produce a record such as this:
> > type=CONTAINER_OP msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 old-contid=18446744073709551615 contid=123456 pid=628 auid=root uid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 comm=bash exe=/usr/bin/bash res=yes
> >
> > The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "pid" to "ses" fields are
> > the orchestrator while the "opid" field is the object's PID, the process
> > being "contained". Old and new audit container identifier values are
> > given in the "contid" fields, while res indicates its success.
> >
> > It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
> > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.
> >
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
> > See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
>
> Note that you have duplicate Signed-off here ^^

Yeah, I caught a few of those for v6 and a number of other formatting
issues.

> Took me a while to understand the flow in audit_set_contid(), but once
> understood it all made perfect sense, so:
>
> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
>
>
> > ---
> > fs/proc/base.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > include/linux/audit.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++
> > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> > kernel/audit.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> > index a23651ce6960..2505c46c8701 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> > @@ -1294,6 +1294,40 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
> > .read = proc_sessionid_read,
> > .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> > };
> > +
> > +static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> > + u64 contid;
> > + int rv;
> > + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
> > +
> > + if (!task)
> > + return -ESRCH;
> > + if (*ppos != 0) {
> > + /* No partial writes. */
> > + put_task_struct(task);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, &contid);
> > + if (rv < 0) {
> > + put_task_struct(task);
> > + return rv;
> > + }
> > +
> > + rv = audit_set_contid(task, contid);
> > + put_task_struct(task);
> > + if (rv < 0)
> > + return rv;
> > + return count;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = {
> > + .write = proc_contid_write,
> > + .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
> > +};
> > #endif
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> > @@ -3005,6 +3039,7 @@ static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> > REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
> > REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
> > + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
> > #endif
> > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> > REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
> > @@ -3393,6 +3428,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> > REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations),
> > REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations),
> > + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations),
> > #endif
> > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
> > REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations),
> > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> > index bde346e73f0c..301337776193 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct audit_field {
> > struct audit_task_info {
> > kuid_t loginuid;
> > unsigned int sessionid;
> > + u64 contid;
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> > struct audit_context *ctx;
> > #endif
> > @@ -189,6 +190,15 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > return tsk->audit->sessionid;
> > }
> >
> > +extern int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 contid);
> > +
> > +static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + if (!tsk->audit)
> > + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> > + return tsk->audit->contid;
> > +}
> > +
> > extern u32 audit_enabled;
> > #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> > static inline int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
> > @@ -250,6 +260,11 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > return AUDIT_SID_UNSET;
> > }
> >
> > +static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> > +}
> > +
> > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF
> > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> >
> > @@ -606,6 +621,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
> > }
> >
> > +static inline bool audit_contid_valid(u64 contid)
> > +{
> > + return contid != AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline bool audit_contid_set(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > +{
> > + return audit_contid_valid(audit_get_contid(tsk));
> > +}
> > +
> > static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf)
> > {
> > audit_log_n_string(ab, buf, strlen(buf));
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > index 36a7e3f18e69..d475cf3b4d7f 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
> > #define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */
> > #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */
> > #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */
> > +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP 1020 /* Define the container id and information */
> >
> > #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
> > #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */
> > @@ -471,6 +472,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status {
> >
> > #define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1
> > #define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1)
> > +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1)
> >
> > /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
> > * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
> > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> > index 67498c5690bb..b5c702abeb42 100644
> > --- a/kernel/audit.c
> > +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> > @@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > }
> > info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> > info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
> > + info->contid = audit_get_contid(current);
> > tsk->audit = info;
> >
> > ret = audit_alloc_syscall(tsk);
> > @@ -258,6 +259,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
> > struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = {
> > .loginuid = INVALID_UID,
> > .sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET,
> > + .contid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET,
> > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
> > .ctx = NULL,
> > #endif
> > @@ -2341,6 +2343,72 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
> > }
> >
> > /**
> > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
> > + * @contid: contid value
> > + *
> > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> > + *
> > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
> > + */
> > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> > +{
> > + u64 oldcontid;
> > + int rc = 0;
> > + struct audit_buffer *ab;
> > + uid_t uid;
> > + struct tty_struct *tty;
> > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
> > +
> > + task_lock(task);
> > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */
> > + if (!task->audit) {
> > + task_unlock(task);
> > + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> > + }
> > + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task);
> > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> > + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */
> > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> > + rc = -EINVAL;
> > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */
> > + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> > + rc = -EPERM;
> > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
> > + else if (!list_empty(&task->children))
> > + rc = -EBUSY;
> > + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> > + rc = -EALREADY;
> > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> > + if (!rc)
> > + task->audit->contid = contid;
> > + task_unlock(task);
> > +
> > + if (!audit_enabled)
> > + return rc;
> > +
> > + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP);
> > + if (!ab)
> > + return rc;
> > +
> > + uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
> > + tty = audit_get_tty();
> > + audit_log_format(ab, "op=set opid=%d old-contid=%llu contid=%llu pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
> > + task_tgid_nr(task), oldcontid, contid,
> > + task_tgid_nr(current), uid,
> > + from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
> > + tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
> > + audit_get_sessionid(current));
> > + audit_put_tty(tty);
> > + audit_log_task_context(ab);
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
> > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
> > + audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
> > + audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !rc);
> > + audit_log_end(ab);
> > + return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/**
> > * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> > * @ab: the audit_buffer
> > *
> > --
> > 1.8.3.1
> >
>
> --
> Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com>
> Software Engineer, Security Technologies
> Red Hat, Inc.

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

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