Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PULL REQUEST] Lock down patches | From | Randy Dunlap <> | Date | Thu, 28 Feb 2019 15:24:39 -0800 |
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On 2/28/19 1:28 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > Hi James, > > David is low on cycles at the moment, so I'm taking over for this time > round. This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, > intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When > enabled and active (by enabling the config option and passing the > "lockdown" option on the kernel command line), various pieces of > kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on > low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as > a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate > evaluation beforehand.
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst says (IMO) that these patches should also have Signed-of-by: <you>.
"The Signed-off-by: tag indicates that the signer was involved in the development of the patch, or that he/she was in the patch's delivery path."
Also, the sysrq key usage should be documented in Documentation/admin-guide/sysrq.rst.
> The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants > of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a > unified upstream implementation to reduce the delta. This PR probably > doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer > to not requiring external patches. > > This PR is mostly the same as the previous attempt, but with the > following changes: > > 1) The integration between EFI secure boot and the lockdown state has > been removed > 2) A new CONFIG_KERNEL_LOCK_DOWN_FORCE kconfig option has been added, > which will always enable lockdown regardless of the kernel command > line > 3) The integration with IMA has been dropped for now. Requiring the > use of the IMA secure boot policy when lockdown is enabled isn't > practical for most distributions at the moment, as there's still not a > great deal of infrastructure for shipping packages with appropriate > IMA signatures, and it makes it complicated for end users to manage > custom IMA policies. > > The following changes since commit a3b22b9f11d9fbc48b0291ea92259a5a810e9438: > > Linux 5.0-rc7 (2019-02-17 18:46:40 -0800) > > are available in the Git repository at: > > https://github.com/mjg59/linux lock_down > > for you to fetch changes up to 43e004ecae91bf9159b8e91cd1d613e58b8f63f8: > > lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages (2019-02-28 > 11:19:23 -0800) > > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > Dave Young (1): > Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot > > David Howells (12): > Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image > Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down > Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down > Lock down TIOCSSERIAL > Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) > x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module > Lock down /proc/kcore > Lock down kprobes > bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down > Lock down perf > debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down > lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages > > Jiri Bohac (2): > kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE > kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down > > Josh Boyer (2): > hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down > acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down > > Kyle McMartin (1): > Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown > > Linn Crosetto (2): > acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down > acpi: Disable APEI error injection if the kernel is locked down > > Matthew Garrett (7): > Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down > kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down > uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down > PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down > x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down > x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down > ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down > > arch/x86/Kconfig | 20 ++++++++++++----- > arch/x86/include/asm/setup.h | 2 ++ > arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 6 ++++-- > arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + > arch/x86/kernel/msr.c | 10 +++++++++ > arch/x86/mm/testmmiotrace.c | 3 +++ > crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 4 +++- > drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c | 3 +++ > drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 3 +++ > drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +- > drivers/acpi/tables.c | 5 +++++ > drivers/char/mem.c | 2 ++ > drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 1 + > drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 ++++++++ > drivers/pci/proc.c | 9 +++++++- > drivers/pci/syscall.c | 3 ++- > drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c | 3 +++ > drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c | 6 ++++++ > drivers/tty/sysrq.c | 19 +++++++++++------ > fs/debugfs/file.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > fs/debugfs/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > fs/proc/kcore.c | 2 ++ > include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ > include/linux/input.h | 5 +++++ > include/linux/kernel.h | 17 +++++++++++++++ > include/linux/kexec.h | 4 ++-- > include/linux/security.h | 9 +++++++- > include/linux/sysrq.h | 8 ++++++- > kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 +++ > kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c | 2 +- > kernel/events/core.c | 5 +++++ > kernel/kexec.c | 7 ++++++ > kernel/kexec_file.c | 56 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ > kernel/kprobes.c | 3 +++ > kernel/module.c | 56 > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ > kernel/params.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++----- > kernel/power/hibernate.c | 2 +- > kernel/power/user.c | 3 +++ > security/Kconfig | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++ > security/Makefile | 3 +++ > security/lock_down.c | 106 > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 41 files changed, 466 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 security/lock_down.c >
-- ~Randy
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