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Subject[PATCH v2 12/13] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks
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This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and
kvm_get_dr().
Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are
exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security
perspective.

Fixes: commit 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code")

Signed-off-by: Nick Finco <nifi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a9e66f09422e..9a2789652231 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1057,9 +1057,11 @@ static u64 kvm_dr6_fixed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

static int __kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val)
{
+ size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
switch (dr) {
case 0 ... 3:
- vcpu->arch.db[dr] = val;
+ vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)] = val;
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val;
break;
@@ -1096,9 +1098,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_dr);

int kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val)
{
+ size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db);
+
switch (dr) {
case 0 ... 3:
- *val = vcpu->arch.db[dr];
+ *val = vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)];
break;
case 4:
/* fall through */
--
2.24.0.525.g8f36a354ae-goog
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