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SubjectRe: [PATCH RFC] KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is trustworthy

> On 8 Nov 2019, at 17:35, Christophe de Dinechin <> wrote:
>> On 7 Nov 2019, at 16:02, Liran Alon <> wrote:
>>> On 7 Nov 2019, at 16:00, Christophe de Dinechin <> wrote:
>>> I share that concern about the naming, although I do see some
>>> value in exposing the cpu_smt_possible() result. I think it’s easier
>>> to state that something does not work than to state something does
>>> work.
>>> Also, with respect to mitigation, we may want to split the two cases
>>> that Paolo outlined, i.e. have KVM_HINTS_REALTIME,
>>> where CORES_CROSSTALKS indicates there may be some
>>> cross-talk between what the guest thinks are isolated cores,
>>> and CORES_LEAKING indicates that cores may leak data
>>> to some other guest.
>>> The problem with my approach is that it is shouting “don’t trust me”
>>> a bit too loudly.
>> I don’t see a value in exposing CORES_LEAKING to guest. As guest have nothing to do with it.
> The guest could display / expose the information to guest sysadmins
> and admin tools (e.g. through /proc).
> While the kernel cannot mitigate, a higher-level product could for example
> have a policy about which workloads can be deployed on a system which
> may leak data to other VMs.
> Christophe

Honestly, I don’t think any sane cloud provider will schedule vCPUs of different guests on same physical CPU core and report this to guest.
Therefore, I think this is only relevant for use-cases where the guest owner is also the host/hypervisor owner. And therefore, doesn’t need this
information exposed in a CPUID bit.
I see your point regarding how in theory it could be used, but I think we should wait and see if such use-case exists before defining this interface.


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