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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH] arch/x86: efistub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the UEFI RNG table
On Sat, 5 Oct 2019 at 13:38, Dominik Brodowski
<linux@dominikbrodowski.net> wrote:
>
> Implement the same mechanism for x86 efistub as introduced by commit
> 568bc4e87033 ("efi/arm*/libstub: Invoke EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL to seed the
> UEFI RNG table") for efi/arm*/libstub, and best described here and there
> as:
>
> Invoke the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL protocol in the context of the stub and
> install the Linux-specific RNG seed UEFI config table. This will be
> picked up by the EFI routines in the core kernel to seed the kernel
> entropy pool.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Hsin-Yi Wang <hsinyi@chromium.org>
> Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: <x86@kernel.org>
>
> ---
>
> As far as I can see, we do not yet make use of the UEFI RNG on x86 at all,
> but only on arm.

If you have a ChaosKey, you may be able to use this driver

http://people.linaro.org/~ard.biesheuvel/ChaosKey/ChaosKeyDxe.efi

to get UEFI to expose the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL. (Use efibootmgr -r to
install it as Driver#### or load it from the UEFI shell using 'load
xxx.efi')

> Note that this works only when Linux is booted as an EFI
> stub, and that the EFI-provided randomness is not credited as entropy
> unless RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set _and_ another patch (on its way
> upstream; thanks Ard!) is applied, see
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190928101428.GA222453@light.dominikbrodowski.net/
>
> Further note that this patch is untested, as the firmware on my old x86
> laptop only has UEFI v2.31. If you want to test it, you may wish to apply
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191005113632.GA74715@light.dominikbrodowski.net/T/#u
> first to get a clear indication in dmesg.
>


>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> index d6662fdef300..4b909e5ab857 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c
> @@ -781,6 +781,9 @@ efi_main(struct efi_config *c, struct boot_params *boot_params)
>
> /* Ask the firmware to clear memory on unclean shutdown */
> efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(sys_table);
> +
> + efi_random_get_seed(sys_table);
> +
> efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(sys_table);
>
> setup_graphics(boot_params);
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> index 0460c7581220..ece24c60fc2c 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> @@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
> # Prevents link failures: __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() is not linked in.
> KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
>
> -lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o
> +lib-y := efi-stub-helper.o gop.o secureboot.o tpm.o \
> + random.o
>
> # include the stub's generic dependencies from lib/ when building for ARM/arm64
> arm-deps-y := fdt_rw.c fdt_ro.c fdt_wip.c fdt.c fdt_empty_tree.c fdt_sw.c
> @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ arm-deps-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += sort.c
> $(obj)/lib-%.o: $(srctree)/lib/%.c FORCE
> $(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
>
> -lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o random.o \
> +lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += arm-stub.o fdt.o string.o \
> $(patsubst %.c,lib-%.o,$(arm-deps-y))
>
> lib-$(CONFIG_ARM) += arm32-stub.o
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> index 7f1556fd867d..05739ae013c8 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
> @@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_alloc(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg,
>
> efi_status_t check_platform_features(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
>
> -efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
> -
> void *get_efi_config_table(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, efi_guid_t guid);
>
> /* Helper macros for the usual case of using simple C variables: */
> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> index bd3837022307..a17cc5841668 100644
> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> @@ -1631,6 +1631,8 @@ static inline void
> efi_enable_reset_attack_mitigation(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg) { }
> #endif
>
> +efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(efi_system_table_t *sys_table_arg);
> +
> void efi_retrieve_tpm2_eventlog(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
>
> /*

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