Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 7 Jan 2019 19:07:03 +0100 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/5 v2][RFC] Encryption and authentication for hibernate snapshot image |
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Hi!
> Thanks for your review! > > > > The hibernate function can be used to snapshot memory pages to an image, > > > then kernel restores the image to memory space in a appropriate time. > > > There have secrets in snapshot image and cracker may modifies it for > > > hacking system. Encryption and authentication of snapshot image can protect > > > the system. > > > > > > Hibernate function requests the master key through key retention service. > > > The snapshot master key can be a trusted key or a user defined key. The > > > name of snapshot master key is fixed to "swsusp-kmk". User should loads > > > swsusp-kmk to kernel by keyctl tool before the hibernation resume. > > > e.g. The swsusp-kmk must be loaded before systemd-hibernate-resume > > > > But if userspace has a key, encryption is useless against root. > > > > Yes, but this concern is not only for hibernation encryption. This patch > set does not provide solution against this concern.
So, can we postpone these patches until we have a solution secure against root users?
> My security goals: > > - Encrypt and authicate hibernate snapshot image in kernel space. Userspace > can only touch an encrypted and signed snapshot image. > > - The code of encryption are in kernel. They will be signed and verify with > kernel binary when secure boot enabled. It's better than using > unauthenticated userspace code at runtime.
These are not goals. I'd like to understand why you want to put it into kernel in the first place. Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature] | |