lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [Jan]   [30]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v4 01/12] Documentation: Document arm64 kpti control
On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 12:07:00 -0600
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> wrote:

Hi,

> For a while Arm64 has been capable of force enabling
> or disabling the kpti mitigations. Lets make sure the
> documentation reflects that.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index
> b799bcf67d7b..9475f02c79da 100644 ---
> a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++
> b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1982,6 +1982,12
> @@ Built with CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK_DEFAULT_OFF=y,
> the default is off.
>
> + kpti= [ARM64] Control page table isolation of
> user
> + and kernel address spaces.
> + Default: enabled on cores which need
> mitigation.

Would this be a good place to mention that we enable it when
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is enabled and we have a valid kaslr_offset? I
found this somewhat surprising, also it's unrelated to the
vulnerability.

Cheers,
Andre

> + 0: force disabled
> + 1: force enabled
> +
> kvm.ignore_msrs=[KVM] Ignore guest accesses to unhandled
> MSRs. Default is 0 (don't ignore, but inject #GP)
>

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-01-30 19:03    [W:0.194 / U:10.344 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site