Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Tvrtko Ursulin <> | Subject | [RFC 2/5] perf: Pass pmu pointer to perf_paranoid_* helpers | Date | Wed, 19 Sep 2018 13:27:48 +0100 |
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From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
To enable per-PMU access controls in a following patch we need to start passing in the PMU object pointer to perf_paranoid_* helpers.
This patch only changes the API across the code base without changing the behaviour.
v2: * Correct errors in core-book3s.c as reported by kbuild test robot.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +- arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c | 2 +- include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- kernel/events/core.c | 15 ++++++++------- kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 6 ++++-- 7 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c index 81f8a0c838ae..1e8b1aed6e81 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c @@ -95,7 +95,13 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs) { return 0; } -static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { } + +static inline void +perf_get_data_addr(struct pmu *pmu, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) +{ + +} + static inline u32 perf_get_misc_flags(struct pt_regs *regs) { return 0; @@ -126,7 +132,13 @@ static unsigned long ebb_switch_in(bool ebb, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_enable(struct perf_event *event) {} static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_disable(struct perf_event *event) {} static void power_pmu_sched_task(struct perf_event_context *ctx, bool sched_in) {} -static inline void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) {} + +static inline void +power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct pmu *pmu,struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) +{ + +} + static void pmao_restore_workaround(bool ebb) { } #endif /* CONFIG_PPC32 */ @@ -170,7 +182,8 @@ static inline unsigned long perf_ip_adjust(struct pt_regs *regs) * pointed to by SIAR; this is indicated by the [POWER6_]MMCRA_SDSYNC, the * [POWER7P_]MMCRA_SDAR_VALID bit in MMCRA, or the SDAR_VALID bit in SIER. */ -static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) +static inline void +perf_get_data_addr(struct pmu *pmu, struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { unsigned long mmcra = regs->dsisr; bool sdar_valid; @@ -195,7 +208,7 @@ static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) if (!(mmcra & MMCRA_SAMPLE_ENABLE) || sdar_valid) *addrp = mfspr(SPRN_SDAR); - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + if (perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && is_kernel_addr(mfspr(SPRN_SDAR))) *addrp = 0; } @@ -435,7 +448,7 @@ static __u64 power_pmu_bhrb_to(u64 addr) } /* Processing BHRB entries */ -static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) +static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct pmu *pmu, struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) { u64 val; u64 addr; @@ -463,8 +476,8 @@ static void power_pmu_bhrb_read(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw) * exporting it to userspace (avoid exposure of regions * where we could have speculative execution) */ - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && - is_kernel_addr(addr)) + if (perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && is_kernel_addr(addr)) continue; /* Branches are read most recent first (ie. mfbhrb 0 is @@ -2066,12 +2079,12 @@ static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val, if (event->attr.sample_type & (PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR | PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) - perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr); + perf_get_data_addr(event->pmu, regs, &data.addr); if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) { struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw; cpuhw = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_hw_events); - power_pmu_bhrb_read(cpuhw); + power_pmu_bhrb_read(event->pmu, cpuhw); data.br_stack = &cpuhw->bhrb_stack; } diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c index 24ffa1e88cf9..e416c9e2400a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c @@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event) * Note that the default paranoia setting permits unprivileged * users to profile the kernel. */ - if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() && + if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 035c37481f57..40ccb4dbbadf 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -3033,7 +3033,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) if (x86_pmu.version < 3) return -EINVAL; - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; event->hw.config |= ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ANY; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c index d32c0eed38ca..878451ef1ace 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c @@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event) * the user needs special permissions to be able to use it */ if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) { - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; } diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index 53c500f0ca79..22906bcc1bcd 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -1179,17 +1179,17 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); -static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(void) +static inline bool perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(const struct pmu *pmu) { return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1; } -static inline bool perf_paranoid_cpu(void) +static inline bool perf_paranoid_cpu(const struct pmu *pmu) { return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0; } -static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(void) +static inline bool perf_paranoid_kernel(const struct pmu *pmu) { return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1; } diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index adcd9eae13fb..f556144bc0c5 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -4108,7 +4108,7 @@ find_get_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct task_struct *task, if (!task) { /* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */ - if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_cpu(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu); @@ -5676,7 +5676,7 @@ static int perf_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT; locked = vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm + extra; - if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && + if ((locked > lock_limit) && perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(event->pmu) && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) { ret = -EPERM; goto unlock; @@ -10492,8 +10492,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_cred; } + pmu = event->pmu; + if (!attr.exclude_kernel) { - if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EACCES; goto err_alloc; } @@ -10501,7 +10503,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, /* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EACCES; goto err_alloc; } @@ -10509,13 +10511,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, /* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */ if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_STACK) && (attr.branch_sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + perf_paranoid_kernel(pmu) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EACCES; goto err_alloc; } if (is_sampling_event(event)) { - if (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) { + if (pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) { err = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto err_alloc; } @@ -10525,7 +10527,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, * Special case software events and allow them to be part of * any hardware group. */ - pmu = event->pmu; if (attr.use_clockid) { err = perf_event_set_clock(event, attr.clockid); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c index 69a3fe926e8c..04ea3afec5b2 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event, /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */ if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) { - if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(p_event->pmu) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!is_sampling_event(p_event)) @@ -82,7 +83,8 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event, * ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak, * only allow root to have these. */ - if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw(p_event->pmu) && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return 0; -- 2.17.1
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