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SubjectRe: [PATCH v11 12/13] intel_sgx: driver documentation
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On 2018-06-08 10:09, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> +Launching enclaves
> +------------------
> +
> +For privileged enclaves the launch is performed simply by submitting the
> +SIGSTRUCT for that enclave to ENCLS(EINIT). For unprivileged enclaves the
> +driver hosts a process in ring-3 that hosts a launch enclave signed with a key
> +supplied for kbuild.
> +
> +The current implementation of the launch enclave generates a token for any
> +enclave. In the future it could be potentially extended to have ways to
> +configure policy what can be lauched.
> +
> +The driver will fail to initialize if it cannot start its own launch enclave.
> +A user space application can submit a SIGSTRUCT instance through the ioctl API.
> +The kernel will take care of the rest.
> +
> +This design assures that the Linux kernel has always full control, which
> +enclaves get to launch and which do not, even if the public key MSRs are

As discussed previously at length, since the kernel needs to execute
ENCLS[EINIT], it has full control to deny the launching of enclaves
regardless of any launch enclave implementation. Please change this
misleading statement.

> +read-only. Having launch intrinsics inside the kernel also enables easy
> +development of enclaves without necessarily needing any heavy weight SDK.
> +Having a low-barrier to implement enclaves could make sense for example for
> +system daemons where amount of dependecies ought to be minimized.

--
Jethro Beekman | Fortanix

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