Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 8/8] ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions | From | Stefan Berger <> | Date | Wed, 30 May 2018 09:08:47 -0400 |
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On 05/30/2018 08:49 AM, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2018-05-24 16:11, Stefan Berger wrote: >> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and >> the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines >> AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules. >> >> With this change we now call integrity_audit_msg_common() to get >> common integrity auditing fields. This now produces the following >> record when parsing an IMA policy rule: >> >> type=UNKNOWN[1806] msg=audit(1527004216.690:311): action=dont_measure \ >> fsmagic=0x9fa0 pid=1613 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 \ >> subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 \ >> op=policy_update cause=parse_rule comm="echo" exe="/usr/bin/echo" \ >> tty=tty2 res=1 >> >> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >> --- >> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 ++- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++-- >> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >> index 4e61a9e05132..776e0abd35cf 100644 >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h >> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ >> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */ >> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */ >> #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */ >> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */ >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs */ >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1806 /* IMA policy rules */ >> >> #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */ >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> index 3aed25a7178a..a8ae47a386b4 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) >> int result = 0; >> >> ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, >> - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); >> + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); > Is it possible to connect this record to a syscall by replacing the > first parameter (NULL) by current->context?
We would have to fix current->context in this case since it is NULL. We get to this location by root cat'ing a policy or writing a policy filename into /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy.
> >> entry->uid = INVALID_UID; >> entry->fowner = INVALID_UID; >> @@ -926,7 +926,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) >> temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE; >> else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK) >> temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; >> - audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result); >> + integrity_audit_msg_common(ab, NULL, NULL, >> + "policy_update", "parse_rule", result); >> audit_log_end(ab); >> return result; >> } > - RGB > > -- > Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems > Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada > IRC: rgb, SunRaycer > Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 >
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