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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 8/8] ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
    On 2018-05-24 16:11, Stefan Berger wrote:
    > The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
    > the IMA "audit" policy action. This patch defines
    > AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to reflect the IMA policy rules.
    >
    > With this change we now call integrity_audit_msg_common() to get
    > common integrity auditing fields. This now produces the following
    > record when parsing an IMA policy rule:
    >
    > type=UNKNOWN[1806] msg=audit(1527004216.690:311): action=dont_measure \
    > fsmagic=0x9fa0 pid=1613 uid=0 auid=0 ses=2 \
    > subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 \
    > op=policy_update cause=parse_rule comm="echo" exe="/usr/bin/echo" \
    > tty=tty2 res=1
    >
    > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    > ---
    > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 3 ++-
    > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 5 +++--
    > 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
    >
    > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
    > index 4e61a9e05132..776e0abd35cf 100644
    > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
    > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
    > @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
    > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */
    > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
    > #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
    > -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
    > +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs */
    > +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE 1806 /* IMA policy rules */
    >
    > #define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
    >
    > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
    > index 3aed25a7178a..a8ae47a386b4 100644
    > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
    > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
    > @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
    > int result = 0;
    >
    > ab = integrity_audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
    > - AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
    > + AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);

    Is it possible to connect this record to a syscall by replacing the
    first parameter (NULL) by current->context?

    > entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
    > entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
    > @@ -926,7 +926,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
    > temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
    > else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
    > temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
    > - audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
    > + integrity_audit_msg_common(ab, NULL, NULL,
    > + "policy_update", "parse_rule", result);
    > audit_log_end(ab);
    > return result;
    > }

    - RGB

    --
    Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
    Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
    Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
    IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
    Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

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