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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 1/7] security: rename security_kernel_read_file() hook
On Fri, 25 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:

> James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> writes:
>
> > On Thu, 24 May 2018, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> >
> >> Below is where I suggest you start on sorting out these security hooks.
> >> - Adding a security_kernel_arg to catch when you want to allow/deny the
> >> use of an argument to a syscall. What security_kernel_file_read and
> >> security_kernel_file_post_read have been abused for.
> >
> > NAK. This abstraction is too semantically weak.
> >
> > LSM hooks need to map to stronger semantics so we can reason about what
> > the hook and the policy is supposed to be mediating.
>
> I will take that as an extremely weak nack as all I did was expose the
> existing code and what the code is currently doing. I don't see how you
> can NAK what is already being merged and used.

It's a strong NAK.

LSM is a logical API, it provides an abstraction layer for security
policies to mediate kernel security behaviors.

Adding an argument to a syscall is not a security behavior.

Loading a firmware file is.

=
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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