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    SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH] tracing, printk: Force no hashing when trace_printk() is used
    On Tue, 3 Apr 2018 13:07:58 -0700
    Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

    > On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 12:41 PM, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:
    > > Both trace_debug is set and kptr_restrict is set to zero in the same
    > > code that produces the above banner. This will allow trace_printk() to
    > > not be affected by security code, as trace_printk() should never be run
    > > on a machine that needs security of this kind.
    >
    > While I think it'd be nice to have a boot-time knob for this (a debate
    > that was unsuccessful in earlier threads), I remain skeptical of
    > having a _runtime_ knob for this, as then it becomes a target (and
    > yes, there are plenty of targets, but why add another).
    >
    > If this was __ro_after_init, maybe that'd be nicer. CONFIG_TRACING=y

    Well, then of course this would need a check to keep modules from
    setting it. But I think I know of a nice alternative.


    > is used everywhere, so this is really just the whole knob debate over
    > again. Instead, I've been following Linus's distillation of %p usage
    > in the kernel:
    >
    > http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFwQEd_d40g4mUCSsVRZzrFPUJt74vc6PPpb675hYNXcKw@mail.gmail.com

    Remember, this isn't a printk() that hangs around for production. I was
    debugging code that modified pointers, and I wanted to make sure that
    the pointer arithmetic was correct (it wasn't), and randomizing the
    output made my prints useless.

    If you are concerned about attack surface, I could make it a bit more
    difficult to tweak by malicious software. What about the patch below?
    It would be much more difficult to modify this knob from an attack
    vector.

    -- Steve

    diff --git a/include/linux/printk.h b/include/linux/printk.h
    index e9b603ee9953..b624493b3991 100644
    --- a/include/linux/printk.h
    +++ b/include/linux/printk.h
    @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static inline void printk_safe_flush_on_panic(void)
    #endif

    extern int kptr_restrict;
    +extern struct static_key trace_debug;

    extern asmlinkage void dump_stack(void) __cold;

    diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
    index 0f47e653ffd8..6c151d00848b 100644
    --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
    +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
    @@ -2864,6 +2864,10 @@ void trace_printk_init_buffers(void)

    buffers_allocated = 1;

    + /* This is a debug kernel, allow pointers to be shown */
    + static_key_enable(&trace_debug);
    + kptr_restrict = 0;
    +
    /*
    * trace_printk_init_buffers() can be called by modules.
    * If that happens, then we need to start cmdline recording
    diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
    index 89f8a4a4b770..c3d8eafecb39 100644
    --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
    +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
    @@ -1345,6 +1345,7 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
    }

    int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
    +struct static_key trace_debug = STATIC_KEY_INIT_FALSE;

    static noinline_for_stack
    char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
    @@ -1962,6 +1963,10 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
    return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
    }

    + /* When the kernel is in debugging mode, show all pointers */
    + if (static_key_false(&trace_debug))
    + return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
    +
    /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
    return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
    }
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