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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 1/1] security: Add mechanism to safely (un)load LSMs after boot time
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On 3/29/2018 7:33 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 29, 2018 at 02:37:10PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 3/29/2018 2:14 PM, Sargun Dhillon wrote:
>>> This patch introduces a mechanism to add mutable hooks and immutable
>>> hooks to the callback chain. It adds an intermediary item to the
>>> chain which separates mutable and immutable hooks. Immutable hooks
>>> are then marked as read-only, as well as the hook heads. This does
>>> not preclude some hooks being able to be mutated (removed).
>>>
>>> It also wraps the hook unloading, and execution with an SRCU. One
>>> SRCU is used across all hooks, as the SRCU struct can be memory
>>> intensive, and hook execution time in general should be relatively
>>> short.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
>>> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 23 ++---
>>> security/Kconfig | 2 +-
>>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
>>> security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
>>> security/security.c | 210 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +-
>>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 3 +-
>>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 3 +-
>>> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 2 +-
>>> 9 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> index 09bc60fb35f1..689e5e72fb38 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
>>> @@ -1981,9 +1981,12 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
>>> extern char *lsm_names;
>>>
>>> extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>>> - char *lsm);
>>> + char *lsm, bool is_mutable);
>>>
>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
>>> +#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
>>> +/* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
>>> +#define __lsm_mutable_after_init
>>> /*
>>> * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
>>> * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the
>>> @@ -1996,21 +1999,9 @@ extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>>> * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as
>>> * careful as the SELinux team.
>>> */
>>> -static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
>>> - int count)
>>> -{
>>> - int i;
>>> -
>>> - for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
>>> - hlist_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
>>> -}
>>> -#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
>>> -
>>> -/* Currently required to handle SELinux runtime hook disable. */
>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
>>> -#define __lsm_ro_after_init
>>> +extern void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count);
>>> #else
>>> -#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
>>> +#define __lsm_mutable_after_init __ro_after_init
>>> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
>>>
>>> extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
>>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>>> index c4302067a3ad..a3b8b1142e6f 100644
>>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>>> @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ config SECURITY
>>> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>>>
>>> config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
>>> - depends on SECURITY
>>> + depends on SECURITY && SRCU
>>> bool
>>> default n
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>>> index 9a65eeaf7dfa..d6cca8169df0 100644
>>> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>>> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
>>> @@ -1155,7 +1155,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
>>> goto buffers_out;
>>> }
>>> security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
>>> - "apparmor");
>>> + "apparmor", false);
>>>
>>> /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
>>> apparmor_initialized = 1;
>>> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
>>> index 48620c93d697..fe4b0d9d44ce 100644
>>> --- a/security/commoncap.c
>>> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
>>> @@ -1363,7 +1363,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>>> void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
>>> {
>>> security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
>>> - "capability");
>>> + "capability", false);
>>> }
>>>
>>> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>>> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
>>> index 3cafff61b049..2ddb64864e3e 100644
>>> --- a/security/security.c
>>> +++ b/security/security.c
>>> @@ -29,6 +29,11 @@
>>> #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
>>> #include <linux/string.h>
>>> #include <net/flow.h>
>>> +#include <linux/srcu.h>
>>> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
>>> +
>>> +#define SECURITY_HOOK_COUNT \
>>> + (sizeof(security_hook_heads) / sizeof(struct hlist_head))
>>>
>>> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
>>>
>>> @@ -36,7 +41,10 @@
>>> #define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
>>>
>>> struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_hook_heads);
>>> +
>>> static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(lsm_notifier_chain);
>>> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(security_hook_mutex);
>>>
>>> char *lsm_names;
>>> /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
>>> @@ -53,6 +61,103 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
>>> +DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(security_hook_srcu);
>>> +static struct security_hook_list null_hooks[SECURITY_HOOK_COUNT];
>>> +#define HAS_FUNC(SHL, FUNC) (SHL->hook.FUNC)
>> The HAS_FUNC() macro will work, but it's awkward outside of the
>> call_..._hook() macros. I think you should document how to use it
>> properly somewhere in here. There are enough cases where the
>> call_..._hook() macros aren't used that someone could have trouble
>> figuring out how to use it.
>>
>>
> What about something like:
>
> security/security.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2ddb64864e3e..bc14125cfc78 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -62,9 +62,37 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
> -DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(security_hook_srcu);
> +/*
> + * With writable hooks, we setup a structure like this:
> + * +------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +--------------+
> + * | | | | | | | | | |
> + * | HEAD +---> Immutable +---> Immutable +---> Null hook +---> Mutable Hook |
> + * | | | Hook 1 | | Hook 2 | | | | |
> + * +------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +-----------+ +--------------+
> + * | | |
> + * v v v
> + * Callback Callback Callback
> + *
> + * The hooks before to null hook are marked only after kernel initialization.
> + * The null hook, as well as the hooks succeeding it are not marked read only,
> + * therefore allowing them be (un)loaded after initialization time.
> + *
> + * Since the null hook doesn't have a callback, we need to check if a hook
> + * is the null hook prior to invoking it.
> + */

I think a comment like this is helpful.

Why not have two hook list heads, one for regular hooks and
one for mutable hooks? You can dispense with the "null hook"
handling.

> static struct security_hook_list null_hooks[SECURITY_HOOK_COUNT];
> -#define HAS_FUNC(SHL, FUNC) (SHL->hook.FUNC)
> +DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(security_hook_srcu);
> +
> +static inline bool is_null_hook(struct security_hook_list *shl)
> +{
> + union {
> + void *cb_ptr;
> + union security_list_options slo;
> + } hook_options;
> +
> + hook_options.slo = shl->hook;
> + return !hook_options.cb_ptr;
> +}

I like the HAS_FUNC() approach better.

What I think would work best is to have a separate list head
for the mutable hooks.



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