Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Casey Schaufler <> | Subject | [PATCH v6 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED | Date | Mon, 5 Nov 2018 11:05:03 -0800 |
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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Allow a complete ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED. Disable the inappropriate privilege check in the capability code that does incompatible locking.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> --- kernel/ptrace.c | 2 -- security/commoncap.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 99cfddde6a55..0b6a9df51c3b 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -331,8 +331,6 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return 0; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 2e489d6a3ac8..70a7e3d19c16 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps)) goto out; - if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) && + ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM; out: -- 2.17.1
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