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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] HID: uhid: prevent uhid_char_write() under KERNEL_DS
    On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 07:18:39PM +0100, 'Jann Horn' via syzkaller-bugs wrote:
    > +cc Andy
    >
    > On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 7:03 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
    > > When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
    > > copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
    > > When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
    > > sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Therefore, UHID_CREATE
    > > must not be allowed in this case.
    > >
    > > For consistency and to make sure all current and future uhid commands
    > > are covered, apply the restriction to uhid_char_write() as a whole
    > > rather than to UHID_CREATE specifically.
    > >
    > > Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
    > > Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
    > > helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.
    > >
    > > Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
    >
    > Wheeeee, it found something! :)
    >
    > > Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
    > > Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.6+
    > > Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    > > ---
    > > drivers/hid/uhid.c | 6 ++++++
    > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
    > >
    > > diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
    > > index 3c55073136064..e94c5e248b56e 100644
    > > --- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
    > > +++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
    > > @@ -705,6 +705,12 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
    > > int ret;
    > > size_t len;
    > >
    > > + if (uaccess_kernel()) { /* payload may contain a __user pointer */
    > > + pr_err_once("%s: process %d (%s) called from kernel context, this is not allowed.\n",
    > > + __func__, task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
    > > + return -EACCES;
    > > + }
    >
    > If this file can conceivably be opened by a process that doesn't have
    > root privileges, this check should be something along the lines of
    > ib_safe_file_access() or sg_check_file_access().
    >
    > Checking for uaccess_kernel() prevents the symptom that syzkaller
    > notices - a user being able to cause a kernel memory access -, but it
    > doesn't deal with the case where a user opens a file descriptor to
    > this device and tricks a more privileged process into writing into it
    > (e.g. by passing it to a suid binary as stdout or stderr).
    >

    Yep, I'll do that.

    > Looking closer, I wonder whether this kind of behavior is limited to
    > the UHID_CREATE request, which has a comment on it saying "/*
    > Obsolete! Use UHID_CREATE2. */". If we could keep this kind of ugly
    > kludge away from the code paths you're supposed to be using, that
    > would be nice...
    >

    I wanted to be careful, but yes AFAICS it can be limited to UHID_CREATE only,
    so I'll do that instead.

    - Eric

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