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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description
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On Tue, 2018-11-13 at 19:43 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 08:15:01AM -0700, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> > Explain how CET works and the no_cet_shstk/no_cet_ibt kernel
> > parameters.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > ---
> > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +
> > Documentation/index.rst | 1 +
> > Documentation/x86/index.rst | 11 +
> > Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst | 266 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 4 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/index.rst
> > create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
>
> So this patch should probably come first in the series so that a reader
> can know what to expect...
>
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > index 92eb1f42240d..3854423f7c86 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> > @@ -2764,6 +2764,12 @@
> > noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
> > noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
> >
> > + no_cet_ibt [X86-64] Disable indirect branch tracking for
> > user-mode
> > + applications
> > +
> > + no_cet_shstk [X86-64] Disable shadow stack support for user-
> > mode
> > + applications
> > +
> > nosmap [X86]
> > Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
> > even if it is supported by processor.
> > diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
> > index 5db7e87c7cb1..1cdc139adb40 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/index.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/index.rst
>
> Please integrate scripts/checkpatch.pl into your patch creation
> workflow. Some of the warnings/errors *actually* make sense:
>
> WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
> #76: FILE: Documentation/x86/index.rst:1:
> +=======================
>
> WARNING: Missing or malformed SPDX-License-Identifier tag in line 1
> #93: FILE: Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst:1:
> +=========================================
>
> > @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ implementation.
> > :maxdepth: 2
> >
> > sh/index
> > + x86/index
> >
> > Filesystem Documentation
> > ------------------------
> > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..9c34d8cbc8f0
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
> > +=======================
> > +X86 Documentation
> > +=======================
> > +
> > +Control Flow Enforcement
> > +========================
> > +
> > +.. toctree::
> > + :maxdepth: 1
> > +
> > + intel_cet
> > diff --git a/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..946f4802a51f
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/x86/intel_cet.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
> > +=========================================
> > +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET)
> > +=========================================
> > +
> > +[1] Overview
> > +============
> > +
> > +Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protection against
> > +return/jump-oriented programming (ROP) attacks. It can be implemented
> > +to protect both the kernel and applications. In the first phase,
> > +only the user-mode protection is implemented on the 64-bit kernel.
>
> s/the// is implemented in 64-bit mode.
>
> > +However, 32-bit applications are supported under the compatibility
> > +mode.
>
> Drop "However":
>
> "32-bit applications are, of course, supported in compatibility mode."
>
> > +
> > +CET includes shadow stack (SHSTK) and indirect branch tracking (IBT).
>
> "CET introduces two a shadow stack and an indirect branch tracking mechanism."
>
> > +The SHSTK is a secondary stack allocated from memory. The processor
>
> s/The//
>
> > +automatically pushes/pops a secure copy to the SHSTK every return
> > +address and,
>
> that reads funny - pls reorganize. Also, what is a "secure copy"?
>
> You mean a copy of every return address which software cannot access?
>
> > by comparing the secure copy to the program stack copy,
> > +verifies function returns are as intended.
>
> ... have not been corrupted/modified."
>
> > The IBT verifies all
> > +indirect CALL/JMP targets are intended and marked by the compiler with
> > +'ENDBR' op codes.
>
> "opcode" - one word. And before you use "ENDBR" you need to explain it
> above what it is.
>
> /me reads further... encounters ENDBR's definition...
>
> ah, ok, so you should say something like
>
> "... and marked by the compiler with the ENDBR opcode (see below)."

I will work on it. Thanks!

Yu-cheng

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