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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection
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Quick reply: I agree, I'm just supporting this :)

--
Computer Architect


> On Oct 2, 2018, at 11:43, Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, Jon Masters wrote:
>
>>> This patch provides an application property based spectre_v2
>>> protection with STIBP against attack from another app from
>>> a sibling hyper-thread. For security sensitive non-dumpable
>>> app, STIBP will be turned on before switching to it for Intel
>>> processors vulnerable to spectre_v2.
>>
>> A general comment. I think in practice this will be similar to the
>> speculative store buffer bypass (aka "variant 4") issue in terms of
>> opt-in mitigation. Many users won't want to take the performance hit of
>> having STIBP by default for peer threads. We should make sure that we
>> don't force users into a mitigation but retain an option. Whether it's
>> default-on or not can be debated, though I think the vendors lean toward
>> having default-off with an opt-in, and customers will probably agree. So
>> anyway, I encourage a pragmatic approach similar to that for SSBD.
>
> Which is what Tim's patchset is implementing on top.
>
> Thanks,
>
> --
> Jiri Kosina
> SUSE Labs
>

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