lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2018]   [Oct]   [16]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
Date
From
Subject[PATCH] Input: uinput - fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
setup.code can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:512 uinput_abs_setup() warn: potential
spectre issue 'dev->absinfo' [w] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing setup.code before using it to index dev->absinfo.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
index 8ec483e..97b0809 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#include <linux/input/mt.h>
#include "../input-compat.h"

+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#define UINPUT_NAME "uinput"
#define UINPUT_BUFFER_SIZE 16
#define UINPUT_NUM_REQUESTS 16
@@ -497,6 +499,7 @@ static int uinput_abs_setup(struct uinput_device *udev,

if (setup.code > ABS_MAX)
return -ERANGE;
+ setup.code = array_index_nospec(setup.code, ABS_MAX + 1);

dev = udev->dev;

--
2.7.4
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2018-10-16 13:14    [W:0.082 / U:2.568 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site