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Subject[PATCH] drivers/misc/sgi-gru: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
req.gid can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

vers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c:200 gru_dump_chiplet_request() warn:
potential spectre issue 'gru_base' [w]

Fix this by sanitizing req.gid before calling macro GID_TO_GRU, which
uses it to index gru_base.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].


Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <>
drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c b/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c
index 313da31..1540a77 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grukdump.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv_hub.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
#include "gru.h"
#include "grutables.h"
#include "gruhandles.h"
@@ -196,6 +199,7 @@ int gru_dump_chiplet_request(unsigned long arg)
/* Currently, only dump by gid is implemented */
if (req.gid >= gru_max_gids)
return -EINVAL;
+ req.gid = array_index_nospec(req.gid, gru_max_gids);

gru = GID_TO_GRU(req.gid);
ubuf = req.buf;
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