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SubjectRe: [PATCH] Input: uinput - fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Hi Gustavo,

On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 01:13:13PM +0200, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> setup.code can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
> a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
> drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:512 uinput_abs_setup() warn: potential
> spectre issue 'dev->absinfo' [w] (local cap)
> Fix this by sanitizing setup.code before using it to index dev->absinfo.

So we are saying that attacker, by repeatedly calling ioctl(...,
UI_ABS_SETUP, ...) will be able to poison branch predictor and discover
another program or kernel secrets? But uinput is a privileged interface
open to root only, as it allows injecting arbitrary keystrokes into the
kernel. And since only root can use uinput, meh?



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