Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation | From | David Woodhouse <> | Date | Fri, 26 Jan 2018 18:26:52 +0000 |
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On Fri, 2018-01-26 at 10:12 -0800, Arjan van de Ven wrote: > On 1/26/2018 10:11 AM, David Woodhouse wrote: > > > > I am *actively* ignoring Skylake right now. This is about per-SKL > > userspace even with SMEP, because we think Intel's document lies to us. > > if you think we lie to you then I think we're done with the conversation? > > Please tell us then what you deploy in AWS for your customers ? > > or show us research that shows we lied to you?
As you know well, I mean "we think Intel's document is not correct".
The evidence which made us suspect that is fairly clear in the last few emails in this thread — it's about the BTB/RSB only having the low bits of the target, which would mean that userspace *can* put malicious targets into the RSB, regardless of SMEP.
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