Messages in this thread | | | From | Matthew Garrett <> | Date | Sat, 5 Aug 2017 14:41:21 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] Enable reset attack mitigation |
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On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 10:34 AM, Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> wrote: > Just an innocent question from a bystander, what's the downside of > unconditionally requesting that memory be overwritten? Does it > prolong reboot noticeably?
Yes, it's just to avoid stalling reboot for as long as it takes to clear RAM.
> I've also wondered why you've chosen to put this in a separate file > rather than the existing secureboot.c, my naive understanding is that > TPM and SecureBoot is related but I'm not an expert on this. It would > allow you to reuse the existing get_efi_var() macro.
It's not related to Secure Boot (systems can have TPMs but not Secure Boot, and vice versa), the spec is managed by a different body (TCG rather than UEFI), and there'll be more TPM-related code for the boot stub in future.
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