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SubjectRe: [PATCH -tip v2 0/2] kprobes/x86: RO text code bugfix and cleanup
On Thu, 17 Aug 2017 11:55:30 +0200
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:

>
> * Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi,
> >
> > This series fixes a kprobe-x86 bug related to RO text and
> > cleans up addressof operators.
> >
> > The first one is an obvious bug that misses to set memory
> > RO when the function fails. And the second one is just a
> > cleanup patch to remove addressof operators ("&") since
> > it is meaningless anymore.
> >
> > V2 has just a following update:
> > - [1/2] Use a helper variable instead of using p->ainsn.insn
> > directly.
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > ---
> >
> > Masami Hiramatsu (2):
> > kprobes/x86: Don't forget to set memory back to RO on failure
> > kprobes/x86: Remove addressof operators
> >
> >
> > arch/x86/include/asm/kprobes.h | 4 ++--
> > arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 15 +++++++++------
> > arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 9 +++++----
> > 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> So I'm totally opposed to the whole approach of modifying the permissions of the
> kernel text virtual memory area.
>
> Firstly, it's racy against other kernel subsystems: what happens if some other
> code patching mechanism does a similar 'mark RWX and then back to RX'? Who
> provides the synchronization? set_memory_*() certainly does not.

Hmm, this sounds common problem for set_memory_*() users.

> Secondly, it's racy against attackers: if an attacker can time the attack to the
> time when a kprobe is installed, then the kernel is still vulnerable.

Right, since this is not against for attackers, but for some unexpected memory
corruption bugs. Yes, this is vulnerable against attackers.

> So how about avoiding the problem altogether by patching the kernel not in its
> virtual text address, but in the direct mappings? Then page permissions won't have
> to be modified, and the whole solution will be more robust and secure.

So would you mean using text_poke()?
OK, that's a good idea. I'll try to rewrite it again with text_poke().

Thank you!

>
> Is there anything I'm missing?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo


--
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>

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