[lkml]   [2017]   [Jun]   [6]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
On Tue, Jun 06, 2017 at 05:56:20AM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Hey Ted,
> On Tue, Jun 6, 2017 at 5:00 AM, Theodore Ts'o <> wrote:
> > Note that crypto_rng_reset() is called by big_key_init() in
> > security/keys/big_key.c as a late_initcall(). So if we are on a
> > system where the crng doesn't get initialized until during the system
> > boot scripts, and big_key is compiled directly into the kernel, the
> > boot could end up deadlocking.
> >
> > There may be other instances of where crypto_rng_reset() is called by
> > an initcall, so big_key_init() may not be an exhaustive enumeration of
> > potential problems. But this is an example of why the synchronous
> > API, although definitely much more convenient, can end up being a trap
> > for the unwary....
> Thanks for pointing this out. I'll look more closely into it and see
> if I can figure out a good way of approaching this.

I don't think big_key even needs randomness at init time. The 'big_key_rng'
could just be removed and big_key_gen_enckey() changed to call
get_random_bytes(). (Or get_random_bytes_wait(), I guess; it's only reachable
via the keyring syscalls.)

It's going to take a while to go through all 217 users of get_random_bytes()
like this, though... It's really a shame there's no way to guarantee good
randomness at boot time.


 \ /
  Last update: 2017-06-12 00:38    [W:0.113 / U:0.560 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site