Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 20 Jun 2017 17:02:50 -0500 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] fs: Reorder inode_owner_or_capable() to avoid needless |
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Quoting Kees Cook (keescook@chromium.org): > Checking for capabilities should be the last operation when performing > access control tests so that PF_SUPERPRIV is set only when it was required > for success (implying that the capability was needed for the operation). > > Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Makes sense, thanks.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > --- > fs/inode.c | 2 +- > fs/namei.c | 2 +- > 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c > index db5914783a71..7092debe90cc 100644 > --- a/fs/inode.c > +++ b/fs/inode.c > @@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode) > return true; > > ns = current_user_ns(); > - if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid)) > + if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER)) > return true; > return false; > } > diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c > index 6571a5f5112e..efe53a5d0737 100644 > --- a/fs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/namei.c > @@ -1008,7 +1008,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link) > /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like, > * otherwise, it must be a safe source. > */ > - if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) || safe_hardlink_source(inode)) > + if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) || inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) > return 0; > > audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link); > -- > 2.7.4 > > > -- > Kees Cook > Pixel Security
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