Messages in this thread | | | From | Kees Cook <> | Date | Tue, 9 May 2017 16:31:00 -0700 | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode |
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On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 3:52 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: > On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> wrote: >>> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 06:02:50AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote: >>>> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 06:00:01AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>> > fs/splice.c has some, ahem, interesting uses that have been the source >>>> > of nasty exploits in the past. Converting them to use iov_iter >>>> > properly would be really, really nice. Christoph, I don't suppose >>>> > you'd like to do that? >>>> >>>> I can take care of all the fs code including this one. >>> >>> I spent the afternoon hacking up where I'd like this to head. It's >>> completely untested as of now: >>> >>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/shortlog/refs/heads/setfs-elimination >> >> Ooooh yes! Nice work. >> >> I love this: >> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/51e83f50f824ca23f5584c172138e6b7c2ff786d >> but I wonder what it'll cause out-of-tree code to do. I mean, I'd >> rather nothing out-of-tree be calling these, but I'd hate 3rd party >> hacks even more. >> >> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/018e0e9030777121fe87e89d43066691e7366587 >> This accidentally(?) removes the kernel-doc comments. >> >> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/78b62c730254fc39fa888cdbdca08fde6e09a798 >> Could this be made defensive? (Return 0 if ret wraps, for example?) I >> see what the comment says, but not everyone will read that. :( >> >> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/a106276ca0294be054bc89ce97219933fe543df1 >> Perhaps unconditionally set USER_DS on exit instead of retaining >> whatever was there? > > I don't like silent fixups. If we want to do this, we should BUG or > at least WARN, not just change the addr limit. But I'm also not > convinced it's indicative of an actual bug here.
Nothing should enter that function with KERNEL_DS set, right?
BUG_ON(get_fs() != USER_DS); set_fs(KERNEL_DS); ... set_fs(USER_DS);
-Kees
-- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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