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SubjectRe: [PATCH v5 0/2] provide check for ro_after_init memory sections
On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 8:35 PM, Eddie Kovsky <ewk@edkovsky.org> wrote:
> Provide a mechanism for other functions to verify that their arguments
> are read-only.
>
> This implements the first half of a suggestion made by Kees Cook for
> the Kernel Self Protection Project:
>
> - provide mechanism to check for ro_after_init memory areas, and
> reject structures not marked ro_after_init in vmbus_register()
>
> http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/02/04/1
>
> The idea is to prevent structures (including modules) that are not
> read-only from being passed to functions. It builds upon the functions
> in kernel/extable.c that test if an address is in the text section.
>
> A build failure on the Blackfin architecture led to the discovery of
> an incomplete definition of the RO_DATA macro used in this series. The
> fixes are in linux-next:
>
> commit 906f2a51c941 ("mm: fix section name for .data..ro_after_init")
>
> commit 939897e2d736 ("vmlinux.lds: add missing VMLINUX_SYMBOL macros")
>
> The latest version of this series uses new symbols provided in these
> fixes. The series now cross compiles on Blackfin without errors. I have
> also test compiled this series on next-20170405 for x86.
>
> I have dropped the third patch that uses these features to check the
> arguments to vmbus_register() because the maintainers have not been
> receptive to using it. My goal right now is to get the API right.
>
> Eddie Kovsky (2):
> module: verify address is read-only
> extable: verify address is read-only
>
> include/linux/kernel.h | 2 ++
> include/linux/module.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> kernel/extable.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/module.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 96 insertions(+)

Andrew, do you have these in your mailbox (it went to lkml), or should
I resend them directly to you? Since they depend on the
__start_ro_after_init naming fixes in -mm, it seemed like it'd be best
to carry these two patches there. If so, please consider them both:

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

(And, from the thread on the module patch, Jessica has Acked that one too.)

Thanks!

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

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