Messages in this thread | | | From | Nick Kralevich <> | Date | Mon, 27 Feb 2017 12:48:32 -0800 | Subject | Re: [Regression?] 1ea0ce4069 ("selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs") stops Android from booting |
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On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 11:53 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> I can reproduce it on angler (with a back-port of just that patch), >> although I am unclear on the cause. The patch is only supposed to >> enable explicit setting of security labels by userspace on cgroup >> files, so it isn't supposed to cause any breakage under existing >> policy. Prior to the patch, the kernel would always just return -1 >> with errno EOPNOTSUPP upon attempts to set security labels on cgroup >> files; with the patch, the kernel may instead return -1 with errno >> EACCES if not allowed. So I suppose if userspace was explicitly >> testing for EOPNOTSUPP and not failing hard in that case, it might >> cause breakage. Not sure why existing userspace would be trying to >> relabel cgroup files, unless it is just a recursive restorecon that >> happens to traverse into a cgroup mount (and in that case, not sure >> why >> it would be fatal). Other possible interaction would be use of >> setfscreatecon() prior to creating a file in cgroup. > > Oh, I see - it is the latter. > > For example, init.rc does mkdir /dev/cpuctl/bg_non_interactive, which > internally looks up the context for that directory from file_contexts > and does a setfscreatecon() followed by a mkdir(). Previously, that > was ignored because cgroup did not support anything other than the > policy-defined label. But now it will try to use that label, which in > turn will trigger a denial in enforcing mode and the create will fail. > > So this is an incompatible change and needs to be reverted. > We'll need to wrap it up with a policy capability or something to allow > it to be enabled only if the policy correctly supports it. Even > better, we should instead just allow the policy to specify which > filesystems should support this behavior (already on the issues list). >
If Android is the only system affected by this bug, I would prefer to just fix Android to allow for this patch, rather than having additional kernel complexity.
-- Nick Kralevich | Android Security | nnk@google.com | 650.214.4037
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