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Subject[PATCH] staging: ccree: ssi_aead: fixed all coding style warnings.
Date
My first kernel patch, fixed warnings.

Signed-off-by: SUNIL KALLUR RAMEGOWDA <kallur.sunil@gmail.com>
---
drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
index ba0954e..afb0036 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_aead.c
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ static void ssi_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)

/* Unmap enckey buffer */
if (ctx->enckey) {
- dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, ctx->enckey, ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
+ dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+ ctx->enckey, ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
dev_dbg(dev, "Freed enckey DMA buffer enckey_dma_addr=%pad\n",
&ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
ctx->enckey_dma_addr = 0;
@@ -225,7 +226,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
return -ENOMEM;
}

-static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req, void __iomem *cc_base)
+static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req,
+ void __iomem *cc_base)
{
struct aead_request *areq = (struct aead_request *)ssi_req;
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
@@ -258,12 +260,20 @@ static void ssi_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *ssi_req, void __iomem *c
ctx->authsize),
SSI_SG_FROM_BUF);

- /* If an IV was generated, copy it back to the user provided buffer. */
+ /* If an IV was generated,
+ * copy it back to the user provided buffer.
+ */
if (areq_ctx->backup_giv) {
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR)
- memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv, areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv,
+ areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
+ CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
+ CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
else if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
- memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv, areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET, CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv,
+ areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
+ CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET,
+ CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
}
}

@@ -274,8 +284,8 @@ static int xcbc_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
{
/* Load the AES key */
hw_desc_init(&desc[0]);
- /* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer as for the output keys,
- * because after this key loading it is not needed anymore
+ /* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer as for the
+ * output keys, because after this key loading it is not needed anymore
*/
set_din_type(&desc[0], DMA_DLLI,
ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr, ctx->auth_keylen,
@@ -427,7 +437,8 @@ static int validate_keys_sizes(struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx)
* (copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block
*/
static int
-ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
dma_addr_t key_dma_addr = 0;
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
@@ -458,9 +469,11 @@ ssi_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keyl
}

if (likely(keylen != 0)) {
- key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+ key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key,
+ keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (unlikely(dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr))) {
- dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
+ dev_err(dev,
+ "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
key, keylen);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -586,7 +599,8 @@ ssi_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
/* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to
* first 4 bytes in CTR IV
*/
- memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + ctx->auth_keylen + ctx->enc_keylen -
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key +
+ ctx->auth_keylen + ctx->enc_keylen -
CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
/* Set CTR key size */
ctx->enc_keylen -= CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
@@ -653,7 +667,8 @@ ssi_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
}

#if SSI_CC_HAS_AES_CCM
-static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);

@@ -855,7 +870,8 @@ ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
(sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
- areq_ctx->src_offset), areq_ctx->cryptlen, NS_BIT);
+ areq_ctx->src_offset),
+ areq_ctx->cryptlen, NS_BIT);
set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
(sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->dst_sgl) +
areq_ctx->dst_offset),
@@ -1255,7 +1271,8 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_hmac_authenc(
ssi_aead_hmac_setup_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_setup_cipher_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_digest_header_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
- ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
+ ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, data_flow_mode,
+ desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_digest_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_digest_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
return;
@@ -1271,14 +1288,16 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_hmac_authenc(
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
/* authenc after..*/
ssi_aead_hmac_setup_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
- ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+ ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH,
+ desc, seq_size, direct);
ssi_aead_process_digest_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_digest_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);

} else { /*DECRYPT*/
/* authenc first..*/
ssi_aead_hmac_setup_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
- ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+ ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc,
+ seq_size, direct);
ssi_aead_process_digest_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
/* decrypt after.. */
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
@@ -1309,7 +1328,8 @@ ssi_aead_xcbc_authenc(
ssi_aead_xcbc_setup_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_setup_cipher_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_digest_header_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
- ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
+ ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, data_flow_mode,
+ desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_digest_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
return;
}
@@ -1324,12 +1344,14 @@ ssi_aead_xcbc_authenc(
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
/* authenc after.. */
ssi_aead_xcbc_setup_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
- ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+ ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc,
+ seq_size, direct);
ssi_aead_process_digest_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
} else { /*DECRYPT*/
/* authenc first.. */
ssi_aead_xcbc_setup_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
- ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+ ssi_aead_process_authenc_data_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc,
+ seq_size, direct);
/* decrypt after..*/
ssi_aead_process_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
@@ -1520,7 +1542,8 @@ static inline int ssi_aead_ccm(

/* process the cipher */
if (req_ctx->cryptlen != 0)
- ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode, desc, &idx);
+ ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode,
+ desc, &idx);

/* Read temporal MAC */
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
@@ -1570,7 +1593,9 @@ static int config_ccm_adata(struct aead_request *req)
struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
//unsigned int size_of_a = 0, rem_a_size = 0;
unsigned int lp = req->iv[0];
- /* Note: The code assume that req->iv[0] already contains the value of L' of RFC3610 */
+ /* Note: The code assume that req->iv[0] already
+ * contains the value of L' of RFC3610
+ */
unsigned int l = lp + 1; /* This is L' of RFC 3610. */
unsigned int m = ctx->authsize; /* This is M' of RFC 3610. */
u8 *b0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_B0_OFFSET;
@@ -1627,11 +1652,18 @@ static void ssi_rfc4309_ccm_process(struct aead_request *req)

/* L' */
memset(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- areq_ctx->ctr_iv[0] = 3; /* For RFC 4309, always use 4 bytes for message length (at most 2^32-1 bytes). */
+ /* For RFC 4309, always use 4 bytes for message
+ * length (at most 2^32-1 bytes).
+ */
+ areq_ctx->ctr_iv[0] = 3;

- /* In RFC 4309 there is an 11-bytes nonce+IV part, that we build here. */
- memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_OFFSET, ctx->ctr_nonce, CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_SIZE);
- memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET, req->iv, CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
+ /* In RFC 4309 there is an 11-bytes nonce+IV part,
+ * that we build here.
+ */
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_OFFSET,
+ ctx->ctr_nonce, CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET,
+ req->iv, CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
req->assoclen -= CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE;
}
@@ -1703,7 +1735,9 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_gcm_setup_ghash_desc(
set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
idx++;

- /* Load GHASH initial STATE (which is 0). (for any hash there is an initial state) */
+ /* Load GHASH initial STATE (which is 0).
+ * (for any hash there is an initial state)
+ */
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0x0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
@@ -1738,7 +1772,8 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_gcm_setup_gctr_desc(
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
idx++;

- if ((req_ctx->cryptlen != 0) && (!req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only)) {
+ if (req_ctx->cryptlen != 0 &&
+ !req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
/* load AES/CTR initial CTR value inc by 2*/
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
@@ -1779,7 +1814,7 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_process_gcm_result_desc(
set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
idx++;

- /* Store GHASH state after GHASH(Associated Data + Cipher +LenBlock) */
+ /* Store GHASH state after GHASH(Associated Data + Cipher+LenBlock) */
hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
@@ -1854,7 +1889,8 @@ static inline int ssi_aead_gcm(
ssi_aead_gcm_setup_gctr_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
/* process(gctr+ghash) */
if (req_ctx->cryptlen != 0)
- ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
+ ssi_aead_process_cipher_data_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode,
+ desc, seq_size);
ssi_aead_process_gcm_result_desc(req, desc, seq_size);

return 0;
@@ -1873,11 +1909,13 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_dump_gcm(
return;

if (title) {
- dev_dbg(dev, "----------------------------------------------------------------------------------");
+ dev_dbg(dev, "-----------------------------------------------
+ -----------------------------------");
dev_dbg(dev, "%s\n", title);
}

- dev_dbg(dev, "cipher_mode %d, authsize %d, enc_keylen %d, assoclen %d, cryptlen %d\n",
+ dev_dbg(dev, "cipher_mode %d, authsize %d, enc_keylen %d,
+ assoclen %d, cryptlen %d\n",
ctx->cipher_mode, ctx->authsize, ctx->enc_keylen,
req->assoclen, req_ctx->cryptlen);

@@ -1894,13 +1932,16 @@ static inline void ssi_aead_dump_gcm(

dump_byte_array("mac_buf", req_ctx->mac_buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

- dump_byte_array("gcm_len_block", req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ dump_byte_array("gcm_len_block", req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a,
+ AES_BLOCK_SIZE);

if (req->src && req->cryptlen)
- dump_byte_array("req->src", sg_virt(req->src), req->cryptlen + req->assoclen);
+ dump_byte_array("req->src", sg_virt(req->src),
+ req->cryptlen + req->assoclen);

if (req->dst)
- dump_byte_array("req->dst", sg_virt(req->dst), req->cryptlen + ctx->authsize + req->assoclen);
+ dump_byte_array("req->dst", sg_virt(req->dst),
+ req->cryptlen + ctx->authsize + req->assoclen);
}
#endif

@@ -1938,10 +1979,14 @@ static int config_gcm_context(struct aead_request *req)
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, &temp64, sizeof(temp64));
temp64 = cpu_to_be64(cryptlen * 8);
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_c, &temp64, 8);
- } else { //rfc4543=> all data(AAD,IV,Plain) are considered additional data that is nothing is encrypted.
+ } else {
+ /* rfc4543=> all data(AAD,IV,Plain) are considered
+ * additional data that is nothing is encrypted.
+ */
__be64 temp64;

- temp64 = cpu_to_be64((req->assoclen + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE + cryptlen) * 8);
+ temp64 = cpu_to_be64((req->assoclen +
+ GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE + cryptlen) * 8);
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, &temp64, sizeof(temp64));
temp64 = 0;
memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_c, &temp64, 8);
@@ -1956,15 +2001,18 @@ static void ssi_rfc4_gcm_process(struct aead_request *req)
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);

- memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_OFFSET, ctx->ctr_nonce, GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_SIZE);
- memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_OFFSET, req->iv, GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_OFFSET,
+ ctx->ctr_nonce, GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_OFFSET,
+ req->iv, GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE);
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
req->assoclen -= GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE;
}

#endif /*SSI_CC_HAS_AES_GCM*/

-static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction direct)
+static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req,
+ enum drv_crypto_direction direct)
{
int rc = 0;
int seq_len = 0;
@@ -1975,7 +2023,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
struct ssi_crypto_req ssi_req = {};

- dev_dbg(dev, "%s context=%p req=%p iv=%p src=%p src_ofs=%d dst=%p dst_ofs=%d cryptolen=%d\n",
+ dev_dbg(dev, "%s context=%p req=%p iv=%p src=%p
+ src_ofs=%d dst=%p dst_ofs=%d cryptolen=%d\n",
((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Enc" : "Dec"),
ctx, req, req->iv, sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset,
sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen);
@@ -2005,7 +2054,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
/* Build CTR IV - Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in
* CTR key to first 4 bytes in CTR IV
*/
- memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce, CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce,
+ CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
if (!areq_ctx->backup_giv) /*User none-generated IV*/
memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
@@ -2020,7 +2070,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
(ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR)) {
areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (areq_ctx->ctr_iv != req->iv) {
- memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, req->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm));
+ memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv,
+ req->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm));
req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
}
} else {
@@ -2031,7 +2082,9 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) {
rc = config_ccm_adata(req);
if (unlikely(rc != 0)) {
- dev_dbg(dev, "config_ccm_adata() returned with a failure %d!",
+ dev_dbg(dev,
+ "config_ccm_adata()
+ returned with a failure %d!",
rc);
goto exit;
}
@@ -2046,7 +2099,8 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
rc = config_gcm_context(req);
if (unlikely(rc != 0)) {
- dev_dbg(dev, "config_gcm_context() returned with a failure %d!",
+ dev_dbg(dev, "config_gcm_context()
+ returned with a failure %d!",
rc);
goto exit;
}
@@ -2063,20 +2117,29 @@ static int ssi_aead_process(struct aead_request *req, enum drv_crypto_direction
if (areq_ctx->backup_giv) {
/* set the DMA mapped IV address*/
if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
- ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
+ ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] =
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr +
+ CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 1;
} else if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) {
- /* In ccm, the IV needs to exist both inside B0 and inside the counter.
- * It is also copied to iv_dma_addr for other reasons (like returning
- * it to the user).
- * So, using 3 (identical) IV outputs.
+ /* In ccm, the IV needs to exist both inside B0
+ * and inside the counter. It is also copied to
+ * iv_dma_addr for other reasons (like returning
+ * it to the user). So, using 3 (identical) IV outputs.
*/
- ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
- ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[1] = sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) + CCM_B0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
- ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[2] = sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) + CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
+ ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] =
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr +
+ CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
+ ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[1] =
+ sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) +
+ CCM_B0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
+ ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[2] =
+ sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) +
+ CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 3;
} else {
- ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr;
+ ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] =
+ areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr;
ssi_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 1;
}

@@ -2231,7 +2294,8 @@ static int ssi_rfc4309_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)

#if SSI_CC_HAS_AES_GCM

-static int ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+static int ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
@@ -2247,7 +2311,8 @@ static int ssi_rfc4106_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsign
return ssi_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
}

-static int ssi_rfc4543_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+static int ssi_rfc4543_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
struct ssi_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
@@ -2724,7 +2789,9 @@ int ssi_aead_free(struct ssi_drvdata *drvdata)

if (aead_handle) {
/* Remove registered algs */
- list_for_each_entry_safe(t_alg, n, &aead_handle->aead_list, entry) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(t_alg, n,
+ &aead_handle->aead_list,
+ entry) {
crypto_unregister_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg);
list_del(&t_alg->entry);
kfree(t_alg);
--
2.7.4
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2017-12-06 23:10    [W:0.269 / U:0.028 seconds]
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