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SubjectRe: [PATCHv5 1/1] ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock

On 04/12/17 17:40, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 04/12/17 15:42, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> On 12/4/2017 1:06 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>> Hi Dmitry,
>>> On Fri, 2017-12-01 at 20:40 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>>>> The original design was discussed 3+ years ago, but was never
>>>> completed/upstreamed.
>>>> Based on the recent discussions with Linus
>>>>, I've rebased this patch.
>>>> Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
>>>> lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
>>>> the iint->mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
>>>> chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential
>>>> deadlock,
>>>> i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
>>>> iint->mutex was eliminated.
>>>> Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
>>>> i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
>>>> implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore,
>>>> certain
>>>> other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.
>>>> More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
>>>> lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file.  As a result, when IMA
>>>> attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
>>>> the i_rwsem again.
>>>> To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
>>>> iint->mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
>>>> problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
>>>> the iint->mutex by introducing additional atomic iint->attr_flags to
>>>> indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
>>>> the iint->mutex first and then the i_rwsem.
>>>> Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
>>>> hooks
>>>> and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
>>>> are set
>>>> or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint->flags on close
>>>> or on open.
>>>> Atomic flags are following:
>>>> * IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod,
>>>> chown, chgrp)
>>>>    and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
>>>> clear
>>>>    iint->flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions again.
>>>> * IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was
>>>> called and
>>>>    extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
>>>> clear
>>>>    iint->flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
>>>> * IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
>>>>    It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
>>>> * IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
>>>>    security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
>>> Nice!  I've been testing with this patch and all seems good.  Before
>>> queueing this patch to be upstreamed, I'd appreciate if others tested
>>> using it as well.  It applies cleanly to the next-queued branch.
>> If the inode lock is released before the IMA_MEASURE flag is set, the
>> ToMToU violation will not be detected when a writer accesses the same
>> inode. This issue was fixed with commit f7a859ff7395c.
>> Roberto
> Hi Roberto,
> I will check the commit.
> Dmitry

It seems you are right... That violation patch came in between locking
patch was there. I do not remember why I have rebased it like it looks
now. But it seems that violation checking needs to be moved under
iint->mutex locking. Hmm. but why I have not done it like that 3 years
ago :)

I will think how to update it.

Thanks for catching it up.


>>> A subsequent patch will remove the O_DIRECT check in
>>> ima_calc_file_hash().
>>> Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc "xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
>>> the VFS inode instead"
>>> thanks,
>>> Mimi
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