lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2017]   [Dec]   [22]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
From
Subject[PATCH 4.14 094/159] x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSENTER stack canary
Date
4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

commit 7fbbd5cbebf118a9e09f5453f686656a167c3d1c upstream.

Now that the SYSENTER stack has a guard page, there's no need for a canary
to detect overflow after the fact.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: aliguori@amazon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@google.com
Cc: keescook@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.572577316@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 3 +--
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 7 -------
4 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -341,7 +341,6 @@ struct tss_struct {
* Space for the temporary SYSENTER stack, used for SYSENTER
* and the entry trampoline as well.
*/
- unsigned long SYSENTER_stack_canary;
unsigned long SYSENTER_stack[64];

/*
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@ bool in_sysenter_stack(unsigned long *st
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct tss_struct *tss = &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss;

- /* Treat the canary as part of the stack for unwinding purposes. */
- void *begin = &tss->SYSENTER_stack_canary;
+ void *begin = &tss->SYSENTER_stack;
void *end = (void *)&tss->SYSENTER_stack + sizeof(tss->SYSENTER_stack);

if ((void *)stack < begin || (void *)stack >= end)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ __visible DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(
*/
.io_bitmap = { [0 ... IO_BITMAP_LONGS] = ~0 },
#endif
- .SYSENTER_stack_canary = STACK_END_MAGIC,
};
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_tss);

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -814,13 +814,6 @@ dotraplinkage void do_debug(struct pt_re
debug_stack_usage_dec();

exit:
- /*
- * This is the most likely code path that involves non-trivial use
- * of the SYSENTER stack. Check that we haven't overrun it.
- */
- WARN(this_cpu_read(cpu_tss.SYSENTER_stack_canary) != STACK_END_MAGIC,
- "Overran or corrupted SYSENTER stack\n");
-
ist_exit(regs);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_debug);

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2017-12-22 10:21    [W:0.549 / U:0.164 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site