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    Subject[PATCH v3 0/2] Restrict dangerous open in sticky directories
    This patch-set introduces two separate features aimed at restricting
    dangerous open in world or group writable sticky directories.
    The purpose is to prevent exploitable bugs in user-space programs
    that don't access sticky directories in the proper way.
    The first patch prevents the O_CREAT open of FIFOs and regular files
    in world or group writable sticky directories, if they already exists
    and are owned by someone else.
    The second patch prevents O_CREAT open in world or group writable
    sticky when the O_EXCL flag is not set, even if the file doesn't
    exist yet.
    More details can be found in the respective commit messages.

    Changes in v3:
    - Fixed format string for uid_t that is unsigned
    (suggested by Jann Horn).
    - Stop checking if file's and parent dir's owners match in
    may_create_no_excl. This will allow to discover potential
    vulnerabilities more easily.

    Salvatore Mesoraca (2):
    Protected FIFOs and regular files
    Protected O_CREAT open in sticky directories

    Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
    fs/namei.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
    include/linux/fs.h | 3 ++
    kernel/sysctl.c | 27 ++++++++++
    4 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)


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