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SubjectRe: [PATCH 00/18] arm64: Unmap the kernel whilst running in userspace (KAISER)

> This patch series implements something along the lines of KAISER for arm64:
> although I wrote this from scratch because the paper has some funny
> assumptions about how the architecture works. There is a patch series
> in review for x86, which follows a similar approach:
> and the topic was recently covered by LWN (currently subscriber-only):
> The basic idea is that transitions to and from userspace are proxied
> through a trampoline page which is mapped into a separate page table and
> can switch the full kernel mapping in and out on exception entry and
> exit respectively. This is a valuable defence against various KASLR and
> timing attacks, particularly as the trampoline page is at a fixed virtual
> address and therefore the kernel text can be randomized
> independently.

If I'm willing to do timing attacks to defeat KASLR... what prevents
me from using CPU caches to do that?

There was blackhat talk about exactly that IIRC...
(cesky, pictures)
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