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SubjectRe: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown
On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 3:50 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 12:18:54PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> This is all theoretical security masturbation. The _real_ attacks have
>> been elsewhere.
>
> In my research on this front I'll have to agree with this, in terms of
> justification and there are only *two* arguments which I've so far have found
> to justify firmware signing:
>
> a) If you want signed modules, you therefore should want signed firmware.
> This however seems to be solved by using trusted boot thing, given it
> seems trusted boot requires having firmware be signed as well. (Docs
> would be useful to get about where in the specs this is mandated,
> anyone?). Are there platforms that don't have trusted boot or for which
> they don't enforce hardware checking for signed firmware for which
> we still want to support firmware signing for? Are there platforms
> that require and use module signing but don't and won't have a trusted
> boot of some sort? Do we care?

TPM-backed Trusted Boot means you don't /need/ to sign anything, since
the measurements of what you loaded will end up in the TPM. But
signatures make it a lot easier, since you can just assert that only
signed material will be loaded and so you only need to measure the
kernel and the trusted keys.

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