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SubjectRe: [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace
On Fri, 10 Nov 2017, David Howells wrote:

> > I fail to see how this fits into the secure boot security model, could you
> > please explain?
> The idea is to prevent cryptographic data for filesystems and other things
> from being read out of the kernel memory as well as to prevent unauthorised
> modification of kernel memory.

Then it would make sense to actually lock down dumping of registers /
function arguments (kprobes can currently do that, ftrace eventually could
as well I guess), but disabling the whole ftrace altogether seems like a
totally unnecessary overkill.

> > Secure boot is about having a constant proof / verification that the code
> > you're running in ring0 can be trusted (IOW is the one that has been
> > signed and verified by the whole boot chain).
> >
> > Checking execution patterns doesn't seem to fit at all.
> I'll defer this question to Alexei since he suggested I needed to deal
> with this too.


Jiri Kosina

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