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    Subject[Part2 PATCH v7 24/38] KVM: Define SEV key management command id
    Date
    Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id
    and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec
    0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf)
    and Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.

    Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
    Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
    Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
    Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
    Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
    Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
    Cc: x86@kernel.org
    Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
    Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
    Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    ---
    .../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++
    include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 80 ++++++++
    2 files changed, 282 insertions(+)

    diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
    index a8ef21e737db..71d6d257074f 100644
    --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
    +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
    @@ -43,3 +43,205 @@ setting the SEV bit before executing VMRUN.::
    SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a VM.
    Hence, the ASID for the SEV-enabled guests must be from 1 to a maximum value
    defined in the CPUID 0x8000001f[ecx] field.
    +
    +SEV Key Management
    +==================
    +
    +The SEV guest key management is handled by a separate processor called the AMD
    +Secure Processor (AMD-SP). Firmware running inside the AMD-SP provides a secure
    +key management interface to perform common hypervisor activities such as
    +encrypting bootstrap code, snapshot, migrating and debugging the guest. For more
    +information, see the SEV Key Management spec [api-spec]_
    +
    +KVM implements the following commands to support common lifecycle events of SEV
    +guests, such as launching, running, snapshotting, migrating and decommissioning.
    +
    +1. KVM_SEV_INIT
    +---------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_INIT command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the SEV platform
    +context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued.
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +2. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
    +-----------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
    +context. To create the encryption context, user must provide a guest policy,
    +the owner's public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session information.
    +
    +Parameters: struct kvm_sev_launch_start (in/out)
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
    + __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */
    + __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */
    +
    + __u64 dh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the guest owner's PDH key */
    + __u32 dh_len;
    +
    + __u64 session_addr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */
    + __u32 session_len;
    + };
    +
    +On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value.
    +
    +For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.2.
    +
    +3. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA
    +-----------------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA is used for encrypting a memory region. It also
    +calculates a measurement of the memory contents. The measurement is a signature
    +of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation
    +that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
    +
    +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
    + __u64 uaddr; /* userspace address to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
    + __u32 len; /* length of the data to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
    + };
    +
    +For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.3.
    +
    +4. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE
    +-------------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command is used to retrieve the measurement of the
    +data encrypted by the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. The guest owner may
    +wait to provide the guest with confidential information until it can verify the
    +measurement. Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at
    +boot, the measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
    +expects.
    +
    +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_measure
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
    + __u64 uaddr; /* where to copy the measurement */
    + __u32 len; /* length of measurement blob */
    + };
    +
    +For more details on the measurement verification flow, see SEV spec Section 6.4.
    +
    +5. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH
    +------------------------
    +
    +After completion of the launch flow, the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command can be
    +issued to make the guest ready for the execution.
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +6. KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS
    +-----------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command is used to retrieve status information about a
    +SEV-enabled guest.
    +
    +Parameters (out): struct kvm_sev_guest_status
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
    + __u32 handle; /* guest handle */
    + __u32 policy; /* guest policy */
    + __u8 state; /* guest state (see enum below) */
    + };
    +
    +SEV guest state:
    +
    +::
    +
    + enum {
    + SEV_STATE_INVALID = 0;
    + SEV_STATE_LAUNCHING, /* guest is currently being launched */
    + SEV_STATE_SECRET, /* guest is being launched and ready to accept the ciphertext data */
    + SEV_STATE_RUNNING, /* guest is fully launched and running */
    + SEV_STATE_RECEIVING, /* guest is being migrated in from another SEV machine */
    + SEV_STATE_SENDING /* guest is getting migrated out to another SEV machine */
    + };
    +
    +7. KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT
    +----------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
    +firmware to decrypt the data at the given memory region.
    +
    +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_dbg {
    + __u64 src_uaddr; /* userspace address of data to decrypt */
    + __u64 dst_uaddr; /* userspace address of destination */
    + __u32 len; /* length of memory region to decrypt */
    + };
    +
    +The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
    +
    +8. KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT
    +----------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
    +firmware to encrypt the data at the given memory region.
    +
    +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_dbg {
    + __u64 src_uaddr; /* userspace address of data to encrypt */
    + __u64 dst_uaddr; /* userspace address of destination */
    + __u32 len; /* length of memory region to encrypt */
    + };
    +
    +The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
    +
    +9. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET
    +------------------------
    +
    +The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET command can be used by the hypervisor to inject secret
    +data after the measurement has been validated by the guest owner.
    +
    +Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_secret
    +
    +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
    +
    +::
    +
    + struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
    + __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
    + __u32 hdr_len;
    +
    + __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the guest memory region where the secret should be injected */
    + __u32 guest_len;
    +
    + __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the hypervisor memory region which contains the secret */
    + __u32 trans_len;
    + };
    +
    +References
    +==========
    +
    +.. [white-paper] http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
    +.. [api-spec] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
    +.. [amd-apm] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
    +.. [kvm-forum] http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
    diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
    index 1f9f26a8e111..027153971c97 100644
    --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
    +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
    @@ -1367,6 +1367,86 @@ struct kvm_enc_region {
    #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbb, struct kvm_enc_region)
    #define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbc, struct kvm_enc_region)

    +/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization command */
    +enum sev_cmd_id {
    + /* Guest initialization commands */
    + KVM_SEV_INIT = 0,
    + KVM_SEV_ES_INIT,
    + /* Guest launch commands */
    + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START,
    + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
    + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA,
    + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET,
    + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
    + KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
    + /* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
    + KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
    + KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA,
    + KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA,
    + KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
    + /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
    + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
    + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA,
    + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA,
    + KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
    + /* Guest status and debug commands */
    + KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
    + KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
    + KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
    + /* Guest certificates commands */
    + KVM_SEV_CERT_EXPORT,
    +
    + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
    +};
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_cmd {
    + __u32 id;
    + __u64 data;
    + __u32 error;
    + __u32 sev_fd;
    +};
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
    + __u32 handle;
    + __u32 policy;
    + __u64 dh_uaddr;
    + __u32 dh_len;
    + __u64 session_uaddr;
    + __u32 session_len;
    +};
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data {
    + __u64 uaddr;
    + __u32 len;
    +};
    +
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
    + __u64 hdr_uaddr;
    + __u32 hdr_len;
    + __u64 guest_uaddr;
    + __u32 guest_len;
    + __u64 trans_uaddr;
    + __u32 trans_len;
    +};
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
    + __u64 uaddr;
    + __u32 len;
    +};
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
    + __u32 handle;
    + __u32 policy;
    + __u32 state;
    +};
    +
    +struct kvm_sev_dbg {
    + __u64 src_uaddr;
    + __u64 dst_uaddr;
    + __u32 len;
    +};
    +
    #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
    #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
    #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
    --
    2.9.5
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