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    Subject[Part2 PATCH v5 26/31] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_SECRET command
    Date
    The command is used for injecting a secret into the guest memory region.

    Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
    Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
    Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
    Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
    Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
    Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    Cc: x86@kernel.org
    Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
    Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

    Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
    ---
    arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    1 file changed, 73 insertions(+)

    diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
    index 2aa50b220163..5ab81cc66333 100644
    --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
    +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
    @@ -6396,6 +6396,75 @@ static int sev_dbg_encrypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
    return sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, argp, false);
    }

    +static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
    +{
    + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
    + struct sev_data_launch_secret *data;
    + struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
    + struct page **pages;
    + void *blob, *hdr;
    + unsigned long n;
    + int ret;
    +
    + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
    + return -ENOTTY;
    +
    + if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
    + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_secret)))
    + return -EFAULT;
    +
    + /* pin the guest memory region */
    + pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
    + if (!pages)
    + return -ENOMEM;
    +
    + /*
    + * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
    + * that pinned memory pages are contiguous.
    + */
    + if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
    + ret = -EINVAL;
    + goto e_unpin_memory;
    + }
    +
    + ret = -ENOMEM;
    + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
    + if (!data)
    + goto e_unpin_memory;
    +
    + /* copy the secret from userspace into a kernel buffer */
    + blob = copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
    + if (IS_ERR(blob)) {
    + ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
    + goto e_free;
    + }
    +
    + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
    + data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
    +
    + /* copy the packet header from userspace into a kernel buffer */
    + hdr = copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
    + if (IS_ERR(hdr)) {
    + ret = PTR_ERR(hdr);
    + goto e_free_blob;
    + }
    + data->trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
    + data->trans_len = params.trans_len;
    +
    + data->handle = sev->handle;
    + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, data, &argp->error);
    +
    + kfree(hdr);
    +
    +e_free_blob:
    + kfree(blob);
    +e_free:
    + kfree(data);
    +e_unpin_memory:
    + sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
    + return ret;
    +}
    +
    static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
    {
    struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
    @@ -6442,6 +6511,10 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
    r = sev_dbg_encrypt(kvm, &sev_cmd);
    break;
    }
    + case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET: {
    + r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
    + break;
    + }
    default:
    break;
    }
    --
    2.9.5
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