Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RESEND PATCH] prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_PDEATHSIG_PROC | From | Jürg Billeter <> | Date | Tue, 03 Oct 2017 19:47:14 +0200 |
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On Tue, 2017-10-03 at 12:40 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Jürg Billeter <j@bitron.ch> writes: > > What's actually the reason that CLONE_NEWPID requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN? > > Does CLONE_NEWPID pose any risks that don't exist for > > CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID? Assuming we can't simply drop the > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, do you see a better solution for this use > > case? > > CLONE_NEWPID without a permission check would allow runing a setuid root > application in a pid namespace. Off the top of my head I can't think of > a really good exploit. But when you mess up pid files, and hide > information from a privileged application I can completely imagine > forcing that application to misbehave in ways the attacker can control. > Leading to bad things.
Could we allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWPID if the no_new_privs bit is set?
Jürg
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