Messages in this thread | | | From | Kees Cook <> | Date | Fri, 6 Jan 2017 12:39:17 -0800 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] perf: protect group_leader from races that cause ctx |
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On Fri, Jan 6, 2017 at 5:14 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote: > On Fri, Jan 06, 2017 at 10:32:51AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote: >> On Thu, Jan 05, 2017 at 03:14:29PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >> > From: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> >> > >> > When moving a group_leader perf event from a software-context to >> > a hardware-context, there's a race in checking and updating that >> > context. The existing locking solution doesn't work; note that it tries >> > to grab a lock inside the group_leader's context object, which you can >> > only get at by going through a pointer that should be protected from these >> > races. If two threads trigger this operation simultaneously, the refcount >> > of 'perf_event_context' will fall to zero and the object may be freed. >> > >> > To avoid that problem, and to produce a simple solution, we can just >> > use a lock per group_leader to protect all checks on the group_leader's >> > context. The new lock is grabbed and released when no context locks are >> > held. >> >> This Changelog really stinks. I'll go try and reverse engineer the thing >> :-(
Sorry! I tried to merge John's changelog with details from the original internal bug report. I guess I failed. :P
> So the fundamental problem is a race of two sys_perf_event_open() calls > trying to move the same (software) group, nothing else, the rest of the > text above is misdirection and side effects. > > And instead of applying the existing locking rules for this exact > scenario, it invents extra locking :-( > > Ok so I came up with the following, compile tested only, since no > reproducer and being fairly grumpy for having to spend entirely too much > time reconstructing the problem.
John, are you able to test this solution? IIUC, you've got a reproducer handy?
Thanks for digging into this Peter!
> [...] > Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
I was just relaying a fix. I noted the original reporter in the first patch, how they asked to be credited:
Reported-by: Di Shen (@returnsme) of KeenLab (@keen_lab), Tencent
-Kees
-- Kees Cook Nexus Security
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