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    SubjectRe: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: do not re-use pirq number cached in pci device msi msg data
    On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 1:46 PM, Stefano Stabellini
    <sstabellini@kernel.org> wrote:
    > On Wed, 11 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
    >> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 8:25 PM, Stefano Stabellini
    >> <sstabellini@kernel.org> wrote:
    >> > On Tue, 10 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
    >> >> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 2:03 PM, Stefano Stabellini
    >> >> <sstabellini@kernel.org> wrote:
    >> >> > On Tue, 10 Jan 2017, Dan Streetman wrote:
    >> >> >> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 10:57 AM, Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org> wrote:
    >> >> >> > On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 2:30 PM, Stefano Stabellini
    >> >> >> > <sstabellini@kernel.org> wrote:
    >> >> >> >> On Mon, 9 Jan 2017, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
    >> >> >> >>> On Mon, Jan 09, 2017 at 10:42:41AM -0500, Dan Streetman wrote:
    >> >> >> >>> > On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 9:59 AM, Boris Ostrovsky
    >> >> >> >>> > <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> wrote:
    >> >> >> >>> > > On 01/06/2017 08:06 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
    >> >> >> >>> > >> On Thu, Jan 05, 2017 at 02:28:56PM -0500, Dan Streetman wrote:
    >> >> >> >>> > >>> Do not read a pci device's msi message data to see if a pirq was
    >> >> >> >>> > >>> previously configured for the device's msi/msix, as the old pirq was
    >> >> >> >>> > >>> unmapped and may now be in use by another pci device. The previous
    >> >> >> >>> > >>> pirq should never be re-used; instead a new pirq should always be
    >> >> >> >>> > >>> allocated from the hypervisor.
    >> >> >> >>> > >> Won't this cause a starvation problem? That is we will run out of PIRQs
    >> >> >> >>> > >> as we are not reusing them?
    >> >> >> >>> > >
    >> >> >> >>> > > Don't we free the pirq when we unmap it?
    >> >> >> >>> >
    >> >> >> >>> > I think this is actually a bit worse than I initially thought. After
    >> >> >> >>> > looking a bit closer, and I think there's an asymmetry with pirq
    >> >> >> >>> > allocation:
    >> >> >> >>>
    >> >> >> >>> Lets include Stefano,
    >> >> >> >>>
    >> >> >> >>> Thank you for digging in this! This has quite the deja-vu
    >> >> >> >>> feeling as I believe I hit this at some point in the past and
    >> >> >> >>> posted some possible ways of fixing this. But sadly I can't
    >> >> >> >>> find the thread.
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> This issue seems to be caused by:
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> commit af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f
    >> >> >> >> Author: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
    >> >> >> >> Date: Wed Dec 1 14:51:44 2010 +0000
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> xen: fix MSI setup and teardown for PV on HVM guests
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> which was a fix to a bug:
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> This fixes a bug in xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs that manifests itself when
    >> >> >> >> trying to enable the same MSI for the second time: the old MSI to pirq
    >> >> >> >> mapping is still valid at this point but xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs would
    >> >> >> >> try to assign a new pirq anyway.
    >> >> >> >> A simple way to reproduce this bug is to assign an MSI capable network
    >> >> >> >> card to a PV on HVM guest, if the user brings down the corresponding
    >> >> >> >> ethernet interface and up again, Linux would fail to enable MSIs on the
    >> >> >> >> device.
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> I don't remember any of the details. From the description of this bug,
    >> >> >> >> it seems that Xen changed behavior in the past few years: before it used
    >> >> >> >> to keep the pirq-MSI mapping, while today it doesn't. If I wrote "the
    >> >> >> >> old MSI to pirq mapping is still valid at this point", the pirq couldn't
    >> >> >> >> have been completely freed, then reassigned to somebody else the way it
    >> >> >> >> is described in this email.
    >> >> >> >>
    >> >> >> >> I think we should indentify the changeset or Xen version that introduced
    >> >> >> >> the new behavior. If it is old enough, we might be able to just revert
    >> >> >> >> af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f. Otherwise we could make the
    >> >> >> >> behavior conditional to the Xen version.
    >> >> >> >
    >> >> >> > Are PT devices the only MSI-capable devices available in a Xen guest?
    >> >> >> > That's where I'm seeing this problem, with PT NVMe devices.
    >> >> >
    >> >> > They are the main ones. It is possible to have emulated virtio devices
    >> >> > with emulated MSIs, for example virtio-net. Althought they are not in
    >> >> > the Xen Project CI-loop, so I wouldn't be surprised if they are broken
    >> >> > too.
    >> >> >
    >> >> >
    >> >> >> > I can say that on the Xen guest with NVMe PT devices I'm testing on,
    >> >> >> > with the patch from this thread (which essentially reverts your commit
    >> >> >> > above) as well as some added debug to see the pirq numbers, cycles of
    >> >> >> > 'modprobe nvme ; rmmod nvme' don't cause pirq starvation, as the
    >> >> >> > hypervisor provides essentially the same pirqs for each modprobe,
    >> >> >> > since they were freed by the rmmod.
    >> >> >
    >> >> > I am fine with reverting the old patch, but we need to understand what
    >> >> > caused the change in behavior first. Maybe somebody else with a Xen PCI
    >> >> > passthrough setup at hand can help with that.
    >> >> >
    >> >> > In the Xen code I can still see:
    >> >> >
    >> >> > case ECS_PIRQ: {
    >> >> > struct pirq *pirq = pirq_info(d1, chn1->u.pirq.irq);
    >> >> >
    >> >> > if ( !pirq )
    >> >> > break;
    >> >> > if ( !is_hvm_domain(d1) )
    >> >> > pirq_guest_unbind(d1, pirq);
    >> >> >
    >> >> > which means that pirq_guest_unbind should only be called on evtchn_close
    >> >> > if the guest is not an HVM guest.
    >> >>
    >> >> I tried an experiment to call get_free_pirq on both sides of a
    >> >> evtchn_close hcall, using two SRIOV nics. When I rmmod/modprobe, I
    >> >> see something interesting; each nic uses 3 MSIs, and it looks like
    >> >> when they shut down, each nic's 3 pirqs are not available until after
    >> >> the nic is done shutting down, so it seems like closing the evtchn
    >> >> isn't what makes the pirq free.
    >> >>
    >> >> [3697700.390188] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 101 irq 290
    >> >> [3697700.390214] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 100 irq 291
    >> >> [3697700.390228] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 99 irq 292
    >> >> [3697700.392789] ixgbevf 0000:00:03.0: NIC Link is Up 10 Gbps
    >> >> [3697700.406167] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 98 irq 293
    >> >> [3697700.406222] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 97 irq 294
    >> >> [3697700.406259] xen:events: creating evtchn using pirq 96 irq 295
    >> >> [3697700.408345] ixgbevf 0000:00:04.0: NIC Link is Up 10 Gbps
    >> >>
    >> >> nic 3 uses pirq 99-101, while nic 4 uses pirq 96-98.
    >> >>
    >> >> [3697705.470151] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: xen_domain() == 1,
    >> >> xen_pv_domain() == 0, xen_hvm_domain() == 1, xen_initial_domain() ==
    >> >> 0, xen_pvh_domain() == 0
    >> >>
    >> >> just to be sure, a bit of dbg so I know what domain this is :-)
    >> >>
    >> >> [3697778.781463] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 93
    >> >> [3697778.781465] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 96 irq 295
    >> >> [3697778.781475] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 92
    >> >> [3697778.781489] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 91
    >> >> [3697778.781490] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 97 irq 294
    >> >> [3697778.781498] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 90
    >> >> [3697778.781508] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 89
    >> >> [3697778.781509] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 98 irq 293
    >> >> [3697778.781517] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 88
    >> >>
    >> >> nic 4 is shutdown first, and closes its evtchns for pirqs 96-98; but
    >> >> none of those become available for get_free_pirq.
    >> >>
    >> >> [3697779.005501] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 98
    >> >>
    >> >> aha, now nic 4 has fully finished shutting down, and nic 3 has started
    >> >> shutdown; we see those pirqs from nic 4 are now available. So it must
    >> >> not be evtchn closing that frees the pirqs.
    >> >>
    >> >> [3697779.005503] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 99 irq 292
    >> >> [3697779.005512] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 97
    >> >> [3697779.005524] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 96
    >> >> [3697779.005526] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 100 irq 291
    >> >> [3697779.005540] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 87
    >> >> [3697779.005611] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 86
    >> >> [3697779.005624] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 101 irq 290
    >> >> [3697779.005659] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 85
    >> >>
    >> >>
    >> >> so, since pci_disable_msix eventually calls xen_teardown_msi_irq()
    >> >> which calls xen_destroy_irq(), i moved the dbg to xen_destroy_irq()
    >> >> (and recompiled/rebooted) and found the pirqs have already been freed
    >> >> before that is called:
    >> >>
    >> >> [3700084.714686] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 98 irq 295
    >> >> [3700084.714702] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 99 irq 294
    >> >> [3700084.714708] xen:events: shutdown_pirq: closing evtchn for pirq 100 irq 293
    >> >> [3700084.775598] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 100
    >> >> [3700084.775599] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 100 irq 293
    >> >> [3700084.775624] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 99
    >> >> [3700084.775631] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 98
    >> >> [3700084.775632] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 99 irq 294
    >> >> [3700084.775646] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 97
    >> >> [3700084.775653] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 96
    >> >> [3700084.775654] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: pirq 98 irq 295
    >> >> [3700084.775666] xen:events: xen_destroy_irq: get_free_pirq returned pirq 95
    >> >>
    >> >>
    >> >> I'm still following thru the kernel code, but it's not immediately
    >> >> obvious what exactly is telling the hypervisor to free the pirqs; any
    >> >> idea?
    >> >>
    >> >> >From the hypervisor code, it seems that the pirq is "available" via
    >> >> is_free_pirq():
    >> >> return !pirq || (!pirq->arch.irq && (!is_hvm_domain(d) ||
    >> >> pirq->arch.hvm.emuirq == IRQ_UNBOUND));
    >> >>
    >> >> when the evtchn is closed, it does:
    >> >> if ( is_hvm_domain(d1) && domain_pirq_to_irq(d1, pirq->pirq) > 0 )
    >> >> unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq(d1, pirq->pirq);
    >> >>
    >> >> and that call to unmap_domain_pirq_emuirq does:
    >> >> info->arch.hvm.emuirq = IRQ_UNBOUND;
    >> >>
    >> >> so, the only thing left is to clear pirq->arch.irq,but the only place
    >> >> I can find that does that is clear_domain_irq_pirq(), which is only
    >> >> called from pirq_guest_unbind() and unmap_domain_pirq(), but I'm not
    >> >> seeing where either of those would be called when all the kernel is
    >> >> doing is disabling a pci device.
    >> >
    >> > Thanks for the info. I think I know what causes the pirq to be unmapped:
    >> > when Linux disables msi or msix on the device, using the regular pci
    >> > config space based method, QEMU (which emulates the PCI config space)
    >> > tells Xen to unmap the pirq.
    >>
    >> aha, via a XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq, maybe? Well that makes more sense then.
    >>
    >> >
    >> > If that's the case, and if it isn't possible for xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs
    >> > to be called a second time without msis being disabled first, then I
    >> > think we can revert the patch.
    >>
    >> It doesn't seem possible to call it twice from a correctly-behaved
    >> driver, but in case of a driver bug that does try to enable msi/msix
    >> multiple times without disabling, __pci_enable_msix() only does
    >> WARN_ON(!!dev->msix_enabled), and __pci_enable_msi_range() only does
    >> WARN_ON(!!dev->msi_enabled); they both will continue. Maybe that
    >> should be changed to warn and also return error, to prevent
    >> re-configuring msi/msix if already configured? Or, maybe the warning
    >> is enough - the worst thing that reverting the patch does is use extra
    >> pirqs, right?
    >
    > I think the warning is enough. Can you confirm that with
    > af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f reverted, also
    >
    > ifconfig eth0 down; ifconfig eth0 up
    >
    > still work as expected, no warnings?

    yes, with the patch that started this thread - which essentially
    reverts af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f - there are no
    warnings and ifconfig down ; ifconfig up work as expected.

    >
    >
    > It looks like the patch that changed hypervisor (QEMU actually) behavior
    > is:
    >
    > commit c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad
    > Author: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com>
    > Date: Wed May 7 13:41:48 2014 +0000
    >
    > qemu-xen: free all the pirqs for msi/msix when driver unload
    >
    > From this commit onward, QEMU started unmapping pirqs when MSIs are
    > disabled. c976437c7dba9c7444fb41df45468968aaa326ad is present in 4.8,
    > 4.7, 4.6, 4.5. The newest release without the commit is Xen 4.4.
    >
    > If we revert af42b8d12f8adec6711cb824549a0edac6a4ae8f, we fix the bug on
    > all Xen versions from 4.5 onward, but we break the behavior on Xen 4.4
    > and older. Given that Xen 4.4 is out of support, I think we should go
    > ahead with it. Opinions?

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