Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 3 Aug 2016 23:44:37 +0200 | From | Peter Zijlstra <> | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open |
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On Wed, Aug 03, 2016 at 11:53:41AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> writes: > > > >> On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 1:30 PM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote: > >> Let me take this another way instead. What would be a better way to > >> provide a mechanism for system owners to disable perf without an LSM? > >> (Since far fewer folks run with an enforcing "big" LSM: I'm seeking as > >> wide a coverage as possible.) > > > > I vote for sandboxes. Perhaps seccomp. Perhaps a per userns sysctl. > > Perhaps something else. > > Peter, did you happen to see Eric's solution to this problem for > namespaces? Basically, a per-userns sysctl instead of a global sysctl. > Is that something that would be acceptable here?
Someone would have to educate me on what a userns is and how that would help here.
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