Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Kees Cook <> | Subject | [PATCH 10/14] parisc/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace | Date | Thu, 9 Jun 2016 14:02:00 -0700 |
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Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org --- arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c index 8edc47c0b98e..e02d7b4d2b69 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -311,10 +311,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request, long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { - /* Do the secure computing check first. */ - if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) - return -1; - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) { /* @@ -325,6 +321,11 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) regs->gr[20] = -1UL; goto out; } + + /* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */ + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + return -1; + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gr[20]); -- 2.7.4
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