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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/4] signals/sigaltstack: If SS_AUTODISARM, bypass on_sig_stack
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Date
03.05.2016 20:31, Andy Lutomirski пишет:
> If a signal stack is set up with SS_AUTODISARM, then the kernel
> inherently avoids incorrectly resetting the signal stack if signals
> recurse: the signal stack will be reset on the first signal
> delivery. This means that we don't need check the stack pointer
> when delivering signals if SS_AUTODISARM is set.
>
> This will make segmented x86 programs more robust: currently there's
> a hole that could be triggered if ESP/RSP appears to point to the
> signal stack but actually doesn't due to a nonzero SS base.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
> Cc: Amanieu d'Antras <amanieu@gmail.com>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
> Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> ---
> include/linux/sched.h | 12 ++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 2950c5cd3005..8f03a93348b9 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -2576,6 +2576,18 @@ static inline int kill_cad_pid(int sig, int priv)
> */
> static inline int on_sig_stack(unsigned long sp)
> {
> + /*
> + * If the signal stack is AUTODISARM then, by construction, we
> + * can't be on the signal stack unless user code deliberately set
> + * SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on the it.
"on the it" -> "on it".

Anyway, I am a bit puzzled with this patch.
You say "unless user code deliberately set
SS_AUTODISARM when we were already on the it"
so what happens in case it actually does?

Without your patch: if user sets up the same sas - no stack switch.
if user sets up different sas - stack switch on nested signal.

With your patch: stack switch in any case, so if user
set up same sas - stack corruption by nested signal.

Or am I missing the intention?

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