Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 9 Mar 2016 13:25:12 -0800 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v10 09/12] arch/x86: enable task isolation functionality | From | Kees Cook <> |
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On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:18 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: > On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 12:58 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote: >>> On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> wrote: >>>> On 03/07/2016 03:55 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let task isolation users who want to detect when they screw up and do >>>>>>> >>a syscall do it with seccomp. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >Can you give me more details on what you're imagining here? Remember >>>>>> >that a key use case is that these applications can remove the syscall >>>>>> >prohibition voluntarily; it's only there to prevent unintended uses >>>>>> >(by third party libraries or just straight-up programming bugs). >>>>>> >As far as I can tell, seccomp does not allow you to go from "less >>>>>> >permissive" to "more permissive" settings at all, which means that as >>>>>> >it exists, it's not a good solution for this use case. >>>>>> > >>>>>> >Or were you thinking about a new seccomp API that allows this? >>>>> >>>>> I was. This is at least the second time I've wanted a way to ask >>>>> seccomp to allow a layer to be removed. >>>> >>>> >>>> Andy, >>>> >>>> Please take a look at this draft patch that intends to enable seccomp >>>> as something that task isolation can use. >>> >>> Kees, this sounds like it may solve your self-instrumentation problem. >>> Want to take a look? >> >> Errrr... I'm pretty uncomfortable with this. I really would like to >> keep the basic semantics of seccomp is simple as possible: filtering >> only gets more restricted.
The other problem is that this won't work if the third-party code actually uses seccomp itself... this isn't composable as-is.
>> >> This doesn't really solve my self-instrumentation desires since I >> still can't sanely deliver signals. I would need a lot more >> convincing. :) >> > > I think you could do it by adding a filter that turns all the unknown > things into SIGSYS, allows sigreturn, and allows the seccomp syscall, > at least in the pop-off-the-filter variant. Then you add this > removably. > > In the SIGSYS handler, you pop off the filter, do your bookkeeping, > update the filter, and push it back on.
No, this won't let the original syscall through. I wanted to be able to document the syscalls as they happened without needing audit or a ptrace monitor. I am currently convinced that my desire for this is no good, and it should just be done with a ptrace monitor...
-Kees
> > --Andy
-- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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