Messages in this thread | | | From | David Howells <> | Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] | Date | Tue, 08 Mar 2016 15:32:14 +0000 |
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Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > The problem boils down to a difficulty in concocting a name that describes a > > complex situation that may change depending on the configuration. I can make > > it "restrict_link_by_any_system_trusted" if you'd prefer. > > > > That's why I want "system trusted keyrings" to refer to the builtin and the > > secondary - *and* an extra UEFI keyring if we grow one of those. It's a > > collection of related keyrings. > > Sigh, this is the same discussion we've had for years.
No, it isn't.
> The UEFI keys should not be trusted to validate the certificates being added > to the IMA keyring.
A machine-security (e.g. UEFI) keyring will conceivably live in certs/system_keyring.c and only be enabled if CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRINGS=y and, say, CONFIG_MACHINE_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y. I didn't say that IMA necessarily has to use it.
What we need to do is define a set of functions allow IMA to get the restrictions it wants, depending on configuration. In the code I currently have, I think we have those:
restrict_link_reject restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_by_system_trusted
If you really want, I can add a restrict_link_for_ima in there, but I'd rather not if IMA can use whichever of the above three most suits it. How about:
restrict_link_reject restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_or_secondary_trusted
> Neither should the keys on the secondary keyring, unless specifically IMA > Kconfig enabled, be used to validate the certificates being added to the IMA > keyring.
Yes.
David
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