Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Tue, 29 Mar 2016 18:04:22 -0500 | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies | | From | Linus Torvalds <> |
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On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu> wrote: > @@ -1231,6 +1232,8 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) > /* This is the point of no return */ > current->sas_ss_sp = current->sas_ss_size = 0; > > + get_random_bytes(¤t->sig_cookie, sizeof(current->sig_cookie)); > +
This should probably just be
current->sig_cookie = get_random_long();
instead. That will use hardware random numbers if available, and be *much* faster.
I realize that some people don't like the hardware random number generators because they don't trust them, but quite frankly, for something like this it's fine. If the attacker is in collusion with the hardware manufacturer, you have way bigger problems than a SROP attack.
Linus
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