Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 11 Mar 2016 09:51:08 +0100 | From | Ingo Molnar <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] x86: Enable full randomization on i386 and X86_32. |
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* Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> wrote:
> Currently on i386 and on X86_64 when emulating X86_32 in legacy mode, only > the stack and the executable are randomized but not other mmapped files > (libraries, vDSO, etc.). This patch enables randomization for the > libraries, vDSO and mmap requests on i386 and in X86_32 in legacy mode. > > By default on i386 there are 8 bits for the randomization of the libraries, > vDSO and mmaps which only uses 1MB of VA. > > This patch preserves the original randomness, using 1MB of VA out of 3GB or > 4GB. We think that 1MB out of 3GB is not a big cost for having the ASLR. > > The first obvious security benefit is that all objects are randomized (not > only the stack and the executable) in legacy mode which highly increases > the ASLR effectiveness, otherwise the attackers may use these > non-randomized areas. But also sensitive setuid/setgid applications are > more secure because currently, attackers can disable the randomization of > these applications by setting the ulimit stack to "unlimited". This is a > very old and widely known trick to disable the ASLR in i386 which has been > allowed for too long. > > Another trick used to disable the ASLR was to set the ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE > personality flag, but fortunately this doesn't work on setuid/setgid > applications because there is security checks which clear Security-relevant > flags. > > This patch always randomizes the mmap_legacy_base address, removing the > possibility to disable the ASLR by setting the stack to "unlimited". > > > Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> > Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
This signoff line is not valid (primary author is first SOB line, patch submitted is last SOB line), I've changed the second Signed-off-by to an Acked-by.
Thanks,
Ingo
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