Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 9 Mar 2016 22:36:21 -0800 | Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] SROP mitigation: Add sysctl to disable SROP protection. | From | Kees Cook <> |
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On Tue, Mar 8, 2016 at 1:00 PM, One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote: > On Tue, 8 Mar 2016 13:47:55 -0700 > Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu> wrote: > >> This patch adds a sysctl argument to disable SROP protection. > > Shouldn't it be a sysctl to enable it irrevocably, otherwise if I have DAC > capability I can turn off SROP and attack something to get to higher > capability levels ? > > (The way almost all distros are set up its kind of academic but for a > properly secured system it might matter).
Perhaps use proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin instead to tie changes strictly to CAP_SYS_ADMIN?
-Kees
> > Alan
-- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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